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I N T R 0 D U C T I0 N.
Strikes and boycotts have recently demanded much of
the attention of the public and the courts. The object
aimed at in the following pages is to determine and
set forth, as completely as is possible within reason-
able limits, the American law pertaining to them. The
English law will be referred to only in so far as it is
necessary to a determination and understanding of the law
in the United States.
In England, labor has been for centuries regulated
by statutes, and much of the law embodied in them has
been held inapplicable to the conditions existing in
this country. Scarcely any important cases involving
strikes or boycotts came before the English courts prior
to the independence of the colonies. The early Ameri-
can decisions had scarcely any English decisions to
guide them; and the later decisions have proceeded
along the lines marked out in the early American cases,
with scarecly any reference to the English decisions
and in almost entire independence of them. The influ-
2ence of the English cases (excepting the early case of
Rex v. The Tailors of Cambridge) has therefore been very
slight in this country, and we can afford to ignore them
as the courts have done.
Although the subject is old, text writers have
given it little attention. The law applicable to strikes
and boycotts must be sought mainly in the cases. These
are comparatively few considering the frequency of strikes,
and are often so hidden away and obscured as not to be
easily discovered. Some recent cases in the United
States Courts are of especial interest.
It is as conspiracies that strikes and boycotts
have come under cognizance of the law, and as such we
shall proceed to treat them. We shall consider them (1)
as conspiracies at common law and (2) as conspiracies
under the statutes. With their political and economic
aspects we are not here concerned. We shall consider
them purely in their legal aspects, as employed by com-
binations and associations of workingmen. In doing
this we shall examine all the leading American cases in
both state and federal courts. To trace something of
the origin and growth of the law pertaining to strikes
3and boycotts ; to show to what extent they are permitted,
and at what point prohibited, by the American law ; and
to point out the remedies, legal and equitable, furnished
against then, is the object of this thesis.
lm
4CHAPTER I.
STRIKES AS CONSPIRACIES.
Section 1. Definition.
A strike is defined in Black's Law Dictionary to be
"The act of a party of workmen employed by the same master
in stopping work all together at a preconcerted time and
refusing to continue until higher wages or shorter time
or some other concession has been granted to them by their
employer." The definition given by Judge Allen in the
New York Court of Appeals (Railroad Co. v Bawns,58 N. Y.
582) and adopted by Mr. Anderson in his Law Dictionary
is : "A combination among laborers, those employed by
others, to compel an increase of wages, a change in the
hours of labor, some change in the manner and mode of
conducting the business of the principal, or to enforce
some particular policy in the character or number of the
men employed, or the like."
Bouvier defines it as "A combined effort of workmen
to obtain higher wages or other concessions from their
employers by stopping work at a preconcerted time."
5Judge Ray in his "Contractual Limitations"says "A
strike is properly defined as 'A simultaneous cessation
of work on the part of workingmen' and its legality or
illegality must depend upon the means by which it is
enforced and on its objects."
The definition of the term recognized by the labor
organizations of the country,and proffered to the court
by the defendants in the notable case of Farmer's Loan
and Trust Co. v Northern Pacific R. R. Co., 60 Federal
at page 820, was this : "A strike is a concerted cessation
of, or refusal to, work until or unless certain conditions
which obtain or are incident to the terms of the employ-
ment are changed. The employe declines to longer work
knowing full well that the employer may immediately employ
another to fill his place, also knowing that he may or
may not be reemployed or returned to service. The
employer has the option of acceding to the demand and
returning the old employes to service, of employing new
men, or of forcing conditions under which the old men
are glad to return to service under the old conditions."
This view of strikes is indeed a rosy one. Judge Jenkins
rejects this definition as "misleading and pretentious".
He declares that this would be the ideal strike, but one
6which never existed in fact ; that the strike of history
has never been free from coercion, turbulence and riot.
He says, "a more exact definition is ; a combined effort
among workmen to compel the master to the con-
cession of a certain demand, by preventing the conduct of
his business until compliance with this demand. The
cessation of work is but one, and the least effective of
the means to the end ; the intimidation of others from
engaging in the service, the interference with and the
disabling and the destruction of property, and resort
to actual force and violence, when requisite to the ac-
complishment of the end, being the other, and more effec-
tive means employed.
It is idle to talk of a peaceable strike ; none such
ever occurred, x x x A strike without violence
would equal the representation of the tragedy of Hamlet
with the part of Hamlet omitted."
This view is perhaps too extreme and will not be
borne out by the facts.
The perception and memory of the learned judge must
have been obscured by visions of Haymarket, Homestead and
Pulmnan. The disorders which accompanied strikes on these
occasions filled his imagination and he w~s unable or un-
7willing to look beyond them. A large crowd of dissatis-
fied men out of employment will often breed turbulence
whether it is designed or not. Disorderly strikes have
been all too frequent. But it is not true that strikes
are invariably or necessarily accompanied by violence or
disorder. At least one peaceable strike has come within
the personal observation of the present writer. In the
City of Ithaca, with its two thousand college students,
merchant tailoring is an important branch of trade. In
the spring of 1893 the journeyman tailors struck in a
body for an advance in wages. There was no threat, no
violence, no disorder, no demonstration beyond a peace-
able parade by the striking journeymen. In a few days
the strike was ended by the employersacceding to the
demands of the workmen.
The great cigar maker's strike at Binghamton in
1890 was peaceable, so was that of the dissatisfied tai-
lors1 associations, of New York, just ended as I write
these lines in this year of grace, 1895 ; and so have
been many others which a little reflection will recall.
The reason why the peaceful strikes seem so few
is because they never attract much public attention ;
while the strike which has any accompaniments of disorder
8like the friendly contests and boyish frolics of college
students, are heralded abroad with great exaggeration
and lurid coloring in the public press.
However much the several definitions may differ in
particulars, they are agreed in the chief essentials ,
that a strike is (1) the simultaneous quitting of work,
(2) by several employes of the same employer, (3) with
preconcerted agreement, and, (4) with intent to coerce
the employer.
Boycott Distinguished. The boycott is a frequent
though not an essential accompaniment of a strike. Many
strikes partake somewhat of the nature of a boycott ; yet
the two are distinct. The latter is not essentially a
labor trouble, but is the effect of any conspiracy to
injure or ruin the business of another, by preventing
others from entering into his employment or from patron-
izing him in his businesswithout lawful excuse.
Lockout Distinguished. A lockout differs from a
strike in that it is usually the act of the employer in
forcing his employes to cease labor by closing his works
and locking the doors against them. The Century Dic-
tionary defines it as "a refusal on the part of an em-
ployer to furnish work to his employes in a body, intend-
9ed as a means of coercion." The supplement to Webster's
Dictionary says "Lockout is a suspension of work on the
part of employers, corresponding to a strike on the part of
the employes." However, a virtual lockout may be,
and is, enacted by employes when they assemble about the
works or picket them in such a manner as to prevent those
who wish to do so from continuing in the employment.
Section 2. Early English Statutes.
The first English statutes intended specially for
the regulation of labor were the "Statutes of Laborers"
(23 and 25 Edw. III.), enacted in 1349 and 1350. They
were the foundation of the system which oppressed the
community for several centuries. They grew out of the
distress which followed the great plague which had creat-
ed a great scarcity of laborers and a consequent demand
for increased wages. These statutes required all work-
men to present themselves with their tools, in open
market, and then to work at fixed wages for whoever
should demand their services. Twice a year they were
obliged to take an oath to serve faithfully. Artificers
who absented themselves from their work were to be brand-
ed with a hot iron on the forehead with the letter F
denoting the falsity of which they had been guilty in
violating their oath to serve according to the statute.
No man or woman was permitted at the end of his service
to depart out of the hundred, rape or wapentake, to
serve or dwell elsewhere, unless he brought letters
patent under the king's seal. Persons harboring for
11
more than one night a wanderer without such letters, were
punishable by a fine.
During two hundred years these statutes were con-
firmed, amended and extended in various ways. The
statute 3 Hen. VI. C. I. (1424)made any attempt to
neutralize or defeat the provisions of these acts, penal
offenses. The more general statute of 273 Edw. VI.
C. 15, passed in 1548, forbade all conspiracies and
covenants of laborers not to work below certain wages,
and made them punishable by severe penalties. Close
upon this came the very important statute of 5 Eliz. C. 4
(1562)which revised and consolidated a greater part of
the earlier legislation. This statute fixed the hours
of labor,-- for one-half the year from five in the morn-
ing till eight in the evening, and the other half of t he
year from twilight to twilight,-- for various trades and
gave justices power to fix the rate of wages.
Piloring, imprisonment, branding and ear splitting
were the humane penalties prescribed by these benign old
statutes for the laborer who violated them.
Mr. Sampson said of these early statutes, (1 Yates
Select Cases 111) :"These and other stupid acts of oppres-
sion are of the same family, so connected in kind that
12
they hang together like a tapeworm. You can not take
one but you must pull all with you."
No other general and permanent act like that of
5 Eliz. was passed until the Combination Laws, 40 Geo. 3
C. 60, in 1800. They declared combinations to raise
wages or to alter the hours of labor to be illegal and
punishable by imprisonment for two months at hard labor.
The same penalty was imposed for interfering with any
person in the conduct of his business and in the employ-
ment of his workmen and servants. Arbitration for labor
disputes is also provided for.
More liberal and progressive views of the rights of
working men and of the relations between employer and
employed resulted in the passage in 1825 of the more
liberal act of 6 Geo. VI. C. 129, designed to supercede
all previous legislation. The modern English doctrine
of the rights of labor and labor organizations may be
said to date from this act. The complete emancipation
of the English laborer is finally proclaimed by the act
of 38 and 39 Victoria, C. 86, passed in 1875, which
specifically guarantees to labor organizations the right
to combine to do any act in furtherance of their
interests, which would not be unlawful if done by an
13
individual.
For our purposes these statutes are important only
as showing, the legal status of the laborer during this
early period, the effect they were able and likely to
have had in obscuring, creating, or modifying the
common law, as applied to combinations of laborers.
14
Section 3. Strikes as Criminal Conspiracies.
Criminal Conspiracies. Strikes, then, have always been
the result of an agreement, combination, or conspiracy.
It is as conspiracies that they concern us here. The
term conspiracy does not give any absolute warrant of
their illegality. As Judge Ray has said above, their
legality or illegality must depend upon their objects and
on the means by which they are enforced. It is said the
intent of the strikers is always to "coerce" the
employer. But coercion in its broad sense is not
always unlawful. A man may be forced or coerced to do
a good and lawful act, by peaceful and lawful means.
It is only when the conpsiracies of the strikers
become criminal that they fall within the prohibition of
the law.
What, then, is a criminal conspiracy ? Lord
Dezman's famous antithesis in Jones' case, (1832), (4 B
and Ad. star page 345.) defines a criminal conspiracy as
A combination to do an unlawful act, or a lawful act by
unlawful means. This definition has been adopted some-
times with slight modifications, in most subsequent cases.
15
Judge Shaw has succeeded in defining the offense more
fully in Com.%v. Hunt (4,Met. at'page 123.)
He says : "We are of opinion that as a general descrip-
tion, though perhaps not a precise and accurate defini--
tion, a conspiracy must be a combination of two or more
persons, by some concerted action, to accomplish some
criminal or unlawful purpose, or to accomplish some pur-
pose not in itself criminal or unlawful, by criminal or
unlawful means."
It has usually been only when strikes have disclosed
the nature and characteristics of a criminal conspiracy
that they have come under the cognizance of a court of i
law. There is no doubt that where strikers cause unlaw-
ful injury to person or property they would be liable in
a civil action for damages. However the impecuniosity
of the strikers and the lack of financial responsibility
in the labor organizations have rendered these actions
usually fruitless and consequently few. Considering the
frequency of strikes there are comparatively very few
adjudicated cases of any kind, on that subject. They
have usually been settled by failure and abandonment of
the strike , by concessions on the part of the employer,
16
or by such suffering on the part of the strikers and
such loss on the part of the employer, as to bring the
parties to a mutual compromise.
Occasionally disorder and violence have been so
prevalent, and business has been so obstructed by the
strikers, that the public authorities have been obliged
to interfere, and the courts have been appealed to for
injunctions, or by prosecutions for Criminal Conspiracy.
Section 4. Were they Criminal at Comnon Law ?
Whether a mere combination to raise wages was a
criminal conspiracy at Common Law has been a much contro?-
verted question. The question has its origin in the
first reported case involving a strike that of
Rex v The Journeymen Tailors of CambrIAge 8 Modern 10
This case arose in England in 1721, and grew out of
an indictment against several journeymen tailors of
Cambridge for conspiring together to raise their wages by
quitting their employme~nt. They were convicted of a
criminal conspiracy, and a motion was rrade for arrest of
jiudgemrent on several errors in the record.
The court conceded that it was no offense for
employers to quit work, but held that a confederation, or
17
combination to raise wages by quitting work simultaneous-
ly was a conspiracy, and as such punishable.
The court said : "The indictment sets forth that
the defendants refused to work under the wages they
demanded ; but although these might be more than is
directed by the statute, yet it is not for the refusing
to work, but for conspiring, that they are indicted, and
a conspiracy of any kind is illegal although the matter
about which they conspired might have been lawful for
them or any of them to do, if they had not conspired to
do it." The court further held that the indictment need
not plead the statute, "because it is a conspiracy which
is an offense at Oonrnon Law."
In holding a conspiracy of any kind to be an offense
at Common Law the court relied on the somewhat mystera-
ious and much disputed case of the Tubwomen v The Brew-
ers of London, which is thought to be reported as Kind v
Starling in 1 Siderfin 174, and 1 Kebles 650. This
case, however, proves to have been an indictment against
the brewers of London for a conspiracy to stop brewing a
small beer, thus detracting greatly from the king's
revenue, and depauperating the farmers of the excise,
18
It bad nothing to do with strikes or wages.
The doctrine of Rex v Journeymen Tailors of
Cambrde, as well as the authority of the volume (8
Modern 10) in which the case is reported have been
vigorously assailed by writers and jurists both in Engo-
land and the United States.
Stephens in his "History of the Criminal Law of
England", (Vol. III p. 209) says : "No case has ever
been cited in which any person was, for having combined
with others for the raising of wages, convicted of a
conspiracy at Common Law before the year 1825. There
is indeed one case, that of the Journeymen Tailors of
Cambridge,8 Mod. 10, which may perhaps be an authority
the other way but this appears doubtful.
Judge Daly, in the case of Master Stavedore's Asso-
ciation v Walsh (2 Daly N. Y.) commenting on the case of
Journeymen Tailors of Cambridge says : "It is not, nor
has it ever been a rule of the Common Law that any mutual
agreement among journeymen for the purpose of raising
their wages, is an indictable offense, or that they are
guilty of a conspiracy if, by preconcert and agreement
they refuse to work unless they receive an advance of
19
wages." He treats the report of the case as altogether
unreliable.
Wright in his "Law of Criminal Conspiracies and
Agreements," page 42, (1873) says of the declaration of
the court as to conspiracies in the case of Tailors of
Cambridge : "This general expression was in no way
necessary for the decision ; it is not supported by its
reference ; and it amounts to the proposition, which is
negatived by every previQus and subsequent authority,
that combination is per se criminal, independently of its
purposes. Moreover that the report is untrustworthy
appears from the fact that the reporter makes the argu-
ments as to the case at Cambridge turn on 7 Geo. 1 C. 13,
which did not apply to Cambridge but only to the metrop-
olis. "
After carefully reviewing the English statutes,
cases, precedents and text books from 1200 to 1825, Mr.
Wright says : "The result of the whole appears to be
that there is not sufficient authority for concluding
that before the close of the 18th century there was
supposed to be any rule of Comrmon Law that combinations
for controlling masters or workmen were criminal, except
20
where the combination was for some purpose punishable
under a statute expressly directed against such combina-
tion. If such a rule is established by the cases
decided since the passing in 1825 of the act 6 Geo. 4, C
129, which have been above considered, this would seem to
be a modern instance of the growth of a crime at Common
Law by reflection from statutes, and of its survival
after the repeal of those statutes, somewhat in the same
manner in which combinations for certain kinds of frauds
continued to be criminal after those frauds had ceased to
be punishable apart from combination."
This view seems altogether reasonable and warranted
by the facts.
Mr. Wright does not attempt to claim that it was
not criminal at Common Law to conspire to do an unlawful
act. There is neither any reason nor any reliable
authority for holding that it was a wrongful or unlawful
act to ask an increase of wages at common law and inde-
pendent of early statutory restrictions. His conclu-
sions do not seem to be inconsistent with the assertion
of 1 Hawkins' Pleas of the Crown C 27, S. 2 (a book of
treat authority) that "all conspiracies whatever, wrns
ful to prejudice a third person are highly criminal
21
Ii
at Common Law. (The italics are ours.)
For further discussion of the early ':Common Law
doctrine see : Wright's "Criminal Conspiracies and
Agreements",; Stephen's History of the Criminal Law of
England, Vol. III ; Arguments of Sampson and Emmet in
the case of the Cordwainers of New York City, Yates
Select cases 1ll ; Com. vHunt_4 Met, ,lll ; Master
Stevedore's Association v, Walsh(Daly 5),Cogley on
"Strikes and Lockouts" (1894).
Notwithstanding all the adverse criticism this doc-
trine was expressly or impliedly approved and adopted
in many English cases.
(Rex v Hammond and Webb 2 esp. 719 ; Rex v. Salter
5 Esp. 125 ; Rex v Bikerdike, 1 Moody and Robinson 179 ;
Rex x Eccles, 1 Leach 274 ; Rex v Ferguson, 2 Starkie,
431 ; Rex v. Bunn 12 Cox. C. C. 316 ; Rex v.Dewitt, 10
Cox C. C. 592 ; Rex v.Mawbey, 6 Term Rep. 619.)
It was the early rule in the United States ; but
owing to the different circumtances, and the greater
freedom of labor in this country, the doctrine was soon
limited and softened in its application.
The American cases which are based upon the common
law doctrine, we shall now proceed to consider.
22
Section 5. Early American Cases,
at Common Law.
Boot and Shoe Makers of Philadelhpha. The earliest
reported case in America is the trial of the Boot and
Shoe Makers of Philadelphia, in the Mayor's Court of that
City in 1806, Recorder Levy presiding. The report of
the case was published in form of a pamphlet which has
become very scarce, and I am indebted to Carson's "Law
of Criminal Conspiracies and Agreements" for facts of
this case and the Pittsburg Cordwainer's case below.
The indictment contained three counts. The first charged
the defendants, who were journeymen cordwainers, with
having conspired to raise the usual wages paid them and
others in their art by refusing to work for such rates,
and by demanding in future an advanced rate in accordance
with a specified schedule of work and wages. The second
count charged them with having agreed, by menaces, threats
and other unlawful means, to prevent others in their art
from working except at the rate of wages fixed by them.
The third count charged that they had conspired to form
a club or combination, and had adopted rules and by-laws
binding themselves and others not to work for any master
23
who should employ any workman who had bro1ten any of the
rules, and that they would by threats, intimidation;, and
otherwise prevent any other workman or journeyman from
working for such master. After setting forth overt
acts, the indictment concluded to the damage of the mas-
ters, to the citizens of the commonwealth generally, and
to the great damage and prejudice of other journeymen in
the art of cordwaining, to the evil example of others, and
against the peace and dignity of the commonwealth.
The Recorder in his charge to the jury, after re-
marking on the natural effect of supply and demand on the
price of labor, and the hardships which the conduct of the
defendants brought to the ccmmunity, and to the more in-
digent defendants themselves, and on the conduct of the
strikers in forcing others to join their society, said :
"What is the case now before us ? A combination of
workmen to raise their wages may be considered in a two-
fold point of view , one is to benefit themselves, and
the other is to injure those %%ho do not join their soci-
ety. The rule of law condemns both. Hawkins, the
greatest authority in the criminal law says that a com-
bination to maintain another, in carrying out a particu-
lar object, whether true or false, is criminal. The
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authority cited from 8 Mod. Rep. does not rest merely
upon the reputation of that book. It is adopted by
Blackstone, and is laid down as law by Lord Mansfield in
1793, that an act innocent in an individual, is rendered
criminal by a confederacy to effect it.
"One man determines not to work under a certain
price and it may be individually the opinion of all. In
such a case it would be lawful for each to refuse to do
so ; for if each stands alone, each may withdraw from his
determination when he pleases. In the turnout last fall,
if each member of the body had stood alone, fettered by
no promises to the rest, many of them might have changed
their opinion as to the wages and gone to work ; but it
has been given to you in evidence that they were bound
down by their agreements, and pledged by mutual engage-
ments to persist in it, however contrary to their own
judgment. The continuance in improper conduct may there-
fore well be attributed to the combination." The de-
fendants were convicted.
Peolev. Melvin. In 1809, the first case in New
York State, involving the question of a strike, came
before the Mayor's Court of New York City, in the form
of an indictment of several journeymen cordwainers of
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New York City. The case is reported as People V. Melvin
in 2 Wheeler's Or. Cases, 262. The indictment charged
a conspiracy of the journeymen cordwainers, with the
features of an unlawful club, rules and by-laws, for the
purpose of raising wages ; a refusal to work, or to let
others work ; threats and a conspiracy to prejudice and
impoverish, by indirect means, master shoe-makers, to
compel other workmen to follow their rules, or, in case
they had broken the rules, to prevent their obtaining em-
ployment in their art.
A motion to quash the indictment was made on the
ground that the combination charged had never been held
to be criminal at common law, even in England ; and that
such indictments were had in England by virtue of the rig-
id statutes of laborers, which were not in force in the
United States. The motion was ably argued before the
Mayor by such brilliant counsel as Griffin and Ermet for
the people, and Messrs Sampson and Colden for the defend-
ants. (See the witty and learned argument of Sampson
gilve:n in full in Yates Select Cases, 111. It is well
worth perusal.) However, the Mayor died before rendering
his decision on the motion ; and, as the counsel did not
wish to undergo the labor of a re-argument before his
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successor, the motion was waived, and the defendants went
to trial and were convicted. In passing sentence, the
mayor said the object of the conviction was rather to ad-
monish than to punish, advised them to alter and modify
their rules and their conduct so as not to incur the fu-
ture penalties of the law. Each was fined a dollar
with costs
The mayor charged the jury that it was sufficient to
constitute the crime of conspiracy if there had been a
combination either to do an unlawful act, or a lawful
act, by unlawful means. He pointed out that the means
employed by the defendants had been arbitrary, coercive
and unlawful, but he expressly abstained from deciding
whether an agreement not to work, except for certain wag-
es, would amount to the offense of conspiracy, without
any unlawful means being taken to enforce it.
Pittsburg Cordwainers' Case. At the trial of the
Pittsburg Cordwainers, at the borough of Pittsburg, in
1815, Judge Roberts endorses the language of Chitty that
"All confederacies wrongfully to prejudice another are
misdemeanors at common law, whether the intention is to
injure his person, his property or his character." In
his charge to the jury he indicated that the indictment
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was not to be considered as a controversy between work-
men and their employers, and he laid down several propo-
sitions which are still sound law in the United States.
He said : "It is a prosecution to preserve the public
peace and to protect your fellow citizens in the quiet
enjoyment of their property and the uninterrupted pursuit
of their lawful business. With the regulation of wages
you have nothing to do. It has been truly said that
every one has the right to affix whatever price he pleases
to his labor. It is not for demanding high prices that
these men are indicted, but for employing unlawful means
to extort those prices ; for using means prejudicial to
the coninunity, x x x x x A conspiracy to compel an em-
ployer to have only a certain description of persons is
indictable. It is a subversion of the liberty of the
citizen. It has a direct tendency to restrain trade
and create a monopoly. A conspiracy to restrain a man
from freely exercising his trade or profession in a par-
ticular place is indictable."
Commonwealth v. Carlisle. Corn. v. Carlisle,
Brightly's Reports (Pa.) 36, which arose in 1821, is the
next authority. It is a leading case on the law of con-
spiracy, being the first to be decided in a court of last
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resort in this country, and being illuminated by the well-
considered opinion of the able Judge Gibson. It does
not, however, directly involve the question of strikes,
employers instead of workmen being the defendants. It is
therefore in point here only as indicating the general
law as to combinations to regulate wages. The case was
brought before the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania on writ
of habeas corpus. It appeared that the relators were
master shoemakers and that they had agreed with each other
not to employ any journeyman who would not consent to
work for reduced wqges ; but it also appeared that the
object went no farther than to re-establish certain rates
which had prevailed some months before, and from which
there was reason to believe the employers had-been com-
pelled to depart by a combination of the workingmen..
A motion to discharge was argued on the ground that
a combination to regulate wages is no offense by the com-
mon law of Pennsylvania. It was held that a combination
is criminal when it has a necessary tendency to prejudice
the public, or to oppress individuals, by unjustly sub-
jecting then to the power of the confederates. Judge
Gibson said :"In no book of authority has the
precise point before me been decided. Rex. v. The Tai-
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lors of Cambridge is found in a book(8Mod. 10,) which
can claim nothing beyond the intrinsic evidence of reason
and good sense apparent in the cases it contains." He
reviews the preceding American cases given above, show-
ing their inapplicability to the case at bar. He con-
tinues, "There are, indeed, a variety of British prece-
dents of indictments of journeymen for combining to raise
their wages, and precedents rank next to decisions as ev-
idence of the law ; but it has been thought sound policy
in England to put this class of the cammunity under such
severe restrictions, by statutes that were never extended
to this country , that we ought to pause before we accept
their law of conspiracy, as respects artisans, which may
be said to have, in some measure, indirectly received its
form from the pressure of positive enactment, and which
therefore may be entirely unfitted to the condition and
habits of the same class here."
He reviews briefly the history and nature of the
crime of conspiracy ; argues that a combination merely
as such is not illegal, and that the motive for combiniing
or the nature of the object to be attained, as a result
of the lawful act, is the discriminative circumstance.
He says •"There the act is lawful for the individual,
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it can be the subject of conspiracy, when done in con-
cert, only where the object is to benefit the conspira-
tors to the prejudice of the public or the oppression of
individuals, and where such prejudice and oppression is
the necessary consequence of the combination." Several
illustrations are given and the judge concludes : "I
take it, then, a combination is criminal, wherever the
act to be done has a necessary tendency to prejudice the
public or to oppress individuals, by unjustly subjecting
them to the power of the confederates, and giving effect
to the purposes of the latter whether of extortion or
mischief. Accordi to this viewof the law a combina-
tion of employers to dpress the wages of journeym be-
low what they should be if there were no recurrence to
artificial means by either side, is criminal."
Twenty-four Journeymen Tailors' Case. The doctrines
laid down by Judge Gibson in Com V. Carlisle, were re-
viewed with approval in the famous trial of the Twenty-
four Journeymen Tailors in the Mayor's Court of Philadel-
phia, in 1827. The pamphlet in which the case w~s pub-
lished has become very scarce, and I am indebted to
Mr. Carson's addeiida to"Wri'ht on t onspiracy" for an ab-
stract of the case.
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The indictment charged the journeymen tailors with :
1. Conspiracy to raise their wages, and promote
their own interests, and to lessen the profits and injure
the interests of their employers, the master tailors.
2. Conspiracy to compel employers to reinstate
certain persons whom they had discharged for demanding
higher wages than the masters alleged they had agreed
to pay.
3. Conspiracy to injure, embarrass and obstruct
the masters in their lawful business.
4. A general conspiracy to injure and oppress
certain journeymen tailors and master workmen who were
not parties to the original agreement, or of the general
combination. The means adopted were : (1) Desisting
from work. (2) Assembling in the streets, obstructing
workmen in the employ of the masters, using threats and
promises to induce them to leave it, pursuing one, as-
saulting another, and sending a threatening letter to a
third.
The Recorder, Hon. Joseph Reed, in an able charge
to the jury, points out the two points of view in which
the offense of conspiracy may be considered ; the one,
where there is a combination to do an act unlawful in
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itself, to the injury of an individual, or of the public
the other, where the act done, or the object of it was
not unlawful, but unlawful means were used to accomplish
it. He explained that the term injury, as applied to
an individual must be taken with some qualification, and
not be considered as meaning such an injury to the
pecuniary interests of another as might arise from the
successful competition of others in the same occupation,
or from other obvious and natural causes. The recorder
refused to accept the English decisions, rejected as
vague and unsatisfactory the language of Judge Roberts in
the Pittsburg case, "that when divers persons confederate
by indirect means to prejudice .a third person, it is a
conspiracy," and expressly adopted the law as stated in
Com. v. Carlisle, sur, with the explanation that he
could not suppose Judge Gibson to have intended "by ar-
tificial means" to include an agreement among the parties
not to work for less wages than they had agreed to accept.
But-he says : "If there was an agreement among the jour-
neymen to operate on other parties, on innocent third
parties, not privy to the original contract, disolaiming
its fancied benefits and unwilling to incur its perils,
such an agreement would no doubt be criminal, especially
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if carried into execution." After reviewing the overt
acts, he states that if there was a difference of opinion
as to the construction of the contract between journeymen
and employers, and the parties to it had refused, the one
to work, or the other to employ, "I am not prepared to
say that an agreement to that effect in either, provided
it did not extend beyond themselves would be illegal."
The case is summed up in the following words .
"These young men have an undoubted right, by agree-
ment among themselves, to regulate their own conduct, to
ask as much as they please for their services, to continue
or to leave the services of any employer, as reason, in-
clination, or caprice should dictate; but the moment they
interfere with the rights and privileges of others,
equally valuable and sacred, as those, which, in this
prosecution, these defendants so jealously contend for,
they(their acts) are criminal, and. if the means employed
be combination, they become conspirators."
P e v, Trequier. n the case of People v. Tre-
quiet and others, ( 1 Wheeler's Cr. C., 142) tried in
City Hall, New York, 1823, the defendants, who were
journeymen hatters, were convicted on an indictment for
conspiracy to ccompel their employer to dis charge a workman
34-
who had worked for wages below those sought to be es-
tablished by the combination. It appeared that the
master hatmakers, the employers, had entered into an
agreement to "knock down wages", and in order to oppose
this reduction the defendants and others had formed a
society and agreed not to work under a certain price.
To sustain this price, they refused to work for their
employer unless he should discharge another workman, the
prosecutor, who had not conformed to the rules of the so-
ciety.
In reply to the claims of the defendants that their
society was necessary to counteract the force of the as-
sociation of the employers, the court said : "One con -
spiracy cannot justify another. However objectionable
the conduct of the master hatters may be, it is certain
that it furnishes-no excuse to the defendants."
This doctrine is somewhat at variance with the view
expressed by Judge Gibson in Com. v. Carlisle, su a,
that "if the accused can show that the object was not to
give an undue value to labor, but to foil their antago-
nists in an attempt to assign to it, by surreptitious
means, a value which it could not otherwise have, they
will make out a good de fense."
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A distinguishing feature of the cases thus far re-
viewed is that they involve coercive measures against
those who were strangers to the combination. It was in-
sisted that not only the masters against whom the strike
was declared, but also the workmen who were not members
of the association, should submit to the regulations of
the confederates. These cases are uniform in holding
that combinations thus to interfere with the rights and
liberty of others and to coerce them into obedience, are
unlawful conspiracies under the common law.
A second and distinct class of cases takes a more
liberal view on the questions of combinations. They
uphold the legality of associations to maintain or ad-
vance wages by rules binding on the members of the associ&
tion and not designed to coerce third parties.
Commonwealth v. Hunt. A leading illustration of
this class is Com. v. Hunt ( 4 Metcalf, 111), tried be-
fore the Supreme Court of Massachusetts in 1842. The
case is not important on account of the point actually
decided, for the decision turned mnainly oni the defects of
the indictment in omitting to charge sufficiently as to
the unlawful means employed. It is chiefly valuable
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for the progressive views expressed by the learned Chief
Justice Shaw.., in his elaborate opinion as to the right
of workmen to associate and combine for certain (lawful)
purposes.
The defendants in Com. v. Hunt were journeymen shoe-
makers and were tried on an indictment for forming them-
selves into a society , and agreeing not to work for any
person who should employ any journeyman or other person
not a member of that society, after notice given him to
discharge such workman.
After reviewing the English common and statutory law
of conspiracies and the cases in which it had been enforc-
ed, and pointing out the limited application of that law
to similar cases in this country, Judge Shaw said : "The
manifest intent of this association is to induce all
those engaged in the same occupation to become members
of it. Such a purpose is not unlawful. It would give
them a power which might be exerted for useful and honor-
able purposes, or for dangerous and pernicious ones.
x x x x Such an association might have been used to
furnish eac a other assistance in times of. poverty, sick-
ness and distress ; or to raise their intellectual, moral
and social conditions, or to make improvement in their
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art or for other lawful purpose. Or the association may
be designed for purposes of oppression and injustice.
But in order to charge all those who become members of
an association with the guilt of a criminal conspiracy
it must be averred and proved that the actual if not
the avowed, object of the association was criminal."
The learned judge goes on to enunciate and illustrate
the right of workmen to work, for whom they please, and,
further, to agree together to exercise theit acknowledged
rights in such a manner as best to subserve their own
interests. But he continues. "We do not understand from
the court in this indictment that the agreement was that
the defendants would refuse to work for an employer, to
whom they were bound by contract for a certain time,
in violation of that contract ; nor that they would in-
sist that an employer should discharge a workman engaged
by contract for a certain time, in violation of that
contract. . . If a large number of
men engaged for a certain time should combine together
to violate their contract and quit their employment to-
gether it would present a very different quest ion."
The defendants were acquitted on the ground that the
indictment did not sufficiently charge that force, in-
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timidation or other unlawful means had been employed to
carry out the objects of what was held to be a lawful
combination.
To the same effect is--Master Stevedore's Associa-
tion v. Walsh, (2 Daly 5), a New York case given below.
See also State v. Donaldsonbelow.
39
Section 6. Later Cases under the Common Law.
The preceeding cases my be said to have defined and
established the common law in New York, Massachusetts,
and Pennsylvania, as applicable to combinations and
conspiracies to raise wages or to alter the conditions of
labor. The decisions, in later cases in these states
were usually determined by statutes defining and regulat-
ing conspiracies. Later cases define and apply the
Coimon Law in other states.
State v. Donaldson : The common law in New Jersey is
laid down in State v.Donaldson, (3 Vroom, 151), 1867.
The case was decided the same year as Master Stevedore's
Association v. Walsh, below, and the nature of the
association was practically the same as in that case ;
but the element of coercion of third parties seems to
have influenced the decision. Here it was held to be an
indictable conspiracy for several employes to combine and
notify their employer, that unless he discharged certain
other workmen, they would quit his employment in a body.
There were at the time this case arose, statutes in
New Jersey, similar to those in New York, forbidding any
combination in re straint of trade and coninerce ; but the
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court thought that the injury to trade in this case was
too remote to warrant an indictment under the statute,
and, grounded its decision on the conmon law of conspiracy
which it held not to have been abrogated by the statute.
In concluding his opinion, Judge Besely said of
Com. v,Hunt su_, that he concurred entirely, as well
with the principles laid down in the opinion as with the
result obtained ; but he distinguished that case on the
ground that the object of the club, against which the
court refused to sustain the indictment in that case was
to establish a general rule for the regulation of its
members ; while the object of the combination now
before the court was to occasion a particular result
which was mischievous, and by means which were oppressive.
State v. Stewart : State v. Stewart et al (59 Vt. 273)
is the leading- recent case decided on the principles of
the common law of conspiracies as applicable to strikes.
It came before the Supreme Court of Vermont in 1887 on a
motion to quash an indictment against the defendants for
conspiracy to hinder and prevent the Ryegate Granite
Works from employing certain granite cutters , and for
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hindering certain laborers from working for the said
corporation. The means alleged were threats, intimida-
tion and violence, which were unlawful under the statute.
It was held that such a combination was a conspiracy
at common law. And further that the subject matter of
the offense being the same in this country as in England;
namely, an interference with the property rights of
third persons, and a restraint upon the lawful prosecu-
tions of their industries as well as an unlawful control
over the free use and employment by workmen of their own
personal skill and labor, at such times, for such prices
and for such persons as they please, and that the common
law of England is "applicable to our local situation and
circumstances" in this regard and was therefore the
common law of Vermont.
The court said : "The principle upon which the
cases, English and American proceed, is, that every man
has a right to employ his talents, industry and capital
as he pleases, free from the dictation of others ; and
if two or more persons combine to coerce his choice in
this behalf, it is a criminal conspiracy. The labor and
skill of the workman, be it of high or low degree, the
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plant of the manufacturer, the equipment of the farmer, the
investments of comnerce, are all in equal sense property,
If men by overt acts of violence destroy either, they are
guilty of crime. The anathemas of a secret organization
of men combined for the purpose of controlling the indus-
try of others by a species of intimidation that works
upon the mind rather than the body, are quite as danger-
ous, and generally altogether more effective, than acts
of actual violence. And while such conspiracies nmy
give the individual directly affected by them a private
right of action for damages, they at the same time lay a
basis for indictment on the ground that the state itself
is directly concerned in the promotion of all legitimate
industries and the development of all its resources, and
owes the duty of protection to its citizens engaged in
the exercise of their callings. The good order, peace
and prosperity of the state are directly involved in the
question."
Cases at Common Law . For further discussion and
application of the common law in America see:
State v Buchanan 5 Hor. and J. (Md.) 317 ; 9 Am. Dec.
534;@
Com. v Haines, 15 Phila. (Pa.) 356 ;
ACom. v. Curren, 3 Pitts. (Pa) 143 ;
State v. Dyer, 128 Mass. 70 ;
Walker v. Cronin,107 Mass. 555 ;
Johnston Harvester Co. v. Meinhardt, 9 Abb. N. Cas. (N. Y.)
393 ; 24 Hun 489 ;
State v Wilson, 30 Conn. 507
Alderman v. People, 4 Mich. 414 ;
People v. Petheram,64 Mich. 252 ;
Collins v. Hayte, 50 Ill. 337 also 50 Ill. 353
Spies v. People 122 Ill,1 ; 3 Am. St. Rep. 320.
People v Fisher, 14 Wend. 9 ;
Master Stevedore's Ass. v Walsh, 2 Daly (N. Y.) 5.;
Rogers v Evarts, 17 N. Y. St. Rep. 264.
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Chapter II.
STRIKES AS CONSPIRACIES UNDER STATUTES 4
Section I. State Statutes Affecting Strikes.
No state in the United States has any statute pro-
hibiting strikes, as such. Many of them, however, have
statutes defining unlawful conspiracies prohibiting
certain conspiracies to interfere with the rights,
liberty or property of others ; or to injure trade or
business.
Many of the states have statutes prohibiting the
use of force, threats or intimidation by either employers
or employes.
It is usually by the use of these unlawful means
that the strikers have brought their actions within the
purview of the statutes.
The New York statutes define what combinations are
criminal conspiracies and abrogate the common law.
Section 168, subo. 5 & 6 of the New York Penal
Code provides that if two or more persons conspire either
(1) To pervent another from exercising any lawful trade
or calling, or doing any lawful act, by force, threats,
intimidation, or by interfering or threatening to interfere
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with tools, implements or property belonging to, or used
by another ; or (2) To commit any act injurious to the
public health, to public morals or to trade or commerce,
x x x each of them is guilty of a misdemeanor.
But Section 170, subc. 2, protects labor organizations
by providing, "That the orderly and peaceable assembling
or co-operation of persons employed in any calling, trade
or handicraft, for the purpose of obtaining an advance
in the rate of wages or compensation, or if maintaining
such rate,is not a conspiracy.
Alabama, Connecticut, Colorado, Georgia, Illinois,
Indiana, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts,
Michigan, Missouri, Montana, New Hampshire, N. Dakota,
Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, S. Caroliaa, S.Dakotg,
Texas, Vermont, W.Virginia, and Wisconsin have statutory
prohibitions against intimidation quite similar to those
of Sec. 168 of the New York Penal Code.
Section 2. Cases Under State
Statutes.
People v.Fisher The first important case to arise
on an indictment under the statutes in New York state
was that of People v. Fisher, (14 Wendell,9), tried in the
Supreme Court in 1835.
The defendants were journeymen shoemakers at Geneva,
N. Yo They entered into an agreement and combination,
(l) That if any journeyman shoemaker, whether a member
of the society or not should make boots for a compensa-
tion below an established rate, he should pay a penalty
of $1.00, for the use of the association ; and (2) that
if any master shoemaker employed any such journeyman who
had violated their rules, they would quit his employa-
ment. One Pennoyer broke the rules of the society by
making boots for a master named Lum for less than the
established rate, and refused to pay the penalty. He
afterwards entered the employ of Lum, and the defendants,
in pursuance of their agreement, quit his employment.
C. J. Savage in an elaborate opinion, held such an
association to be a violation of the revised statutes
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making it a misdemeanor to conspire to do an act in-
jurious to trade, or commerce. He said that the legis-
lature had defined conspiracy, and abrogated the conmon
law on the subjedt. "The conspiracy in this case was
not to commit an offense within the meaning of the
statute ; the raising of wages is no offense ; the con-
spiracy is the offense, if any has been corrnitted, x x x
The man who ownes an article of trade or commerce is
not obliged to sell it for any particular price, nor is
the mechanic obliged by law to work for any particular
price. He may say that he will not make coarse boots
for less than $1.00 per pair, but he has no right to say
that no other mechanic shall make them for less. The
cloth merchant may say that he will not sell his goods
for less than so much per yard but he has no right to
say that any other merchant shall not sell for less
price. If one individual does not possess such a right
over the conduct of another, no number of individuals
can possess such a right. All combinations, therefore,
to effect such an object, are injurious, not only to the
individual oppressed but also to the public at large.
In the present case an industrious man was driven
out of employment by the unlawful measures pursued by
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the defendants, and an injury done to the community by
diminishing the quantity of productive labor, and of
internal trade."
Master Stevedores' Association v.Walsh : The next
important New York case is,- Master Stevedore's Associa-
tion v.Walsh,(2,Daly 5), 1867. This was an action
brought by the association against one of its own members
for the recovery of a penalty which the by-laws pro-
vided should be forfeited to the society by any member
who should work for less wages than the rates agreed upon
by the society. The court held that such an association
was not an unlawful combination to commit an act in-
jurious to trade or conerce within the meaning of Rev.
Stat. 1691 (Penal Code Sec. 168);that such a by-law was
not unlawful as made in restraint of trade ; and that
the society having a right to make such by-law, had a
right to attach to its violation a penalty, which was
collectible in an action at law.
Judge Daly in his opinion distinguishes this from
former cases, especially, People v Fisher supra., wher e
by-laws were sought to be enforced against those who
had not voluntarily submitted to them. He severely
crititizes the length to which C. J. Savage went in his
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opinion, denying, and making a strong argument to dis-
prove,that it had ever been a rule of the Common Law that
it was criminal . se for workmen to agree together for
the purpose of raising their wages, or that they are
guilty of a criminal conspiracy if by preconcert and
arrangement they refuse to work unless they receive an
advance in wages. He indorses the language of Judge
Gibson in Cam. v. Carlisle supra, and adopts the broad
proposition laid down in Co_. v. Hunt, supra, that men
are free to work for whom they please, or not to work if
they prefer ; and that it is not criminal for them to
agree together to exercise this right in such a manner
as to subserve their own best interests.
The court concludes : "It is otherwise, however,
when associations are formed to intimidate employers or
to coerce other journeymen ; and it matters little what
are the measures adopted, if the object of them is to
interfere with the rights or to coerce the free action of
others. xx x It may be laid down as the result
of this examination that it is lawful for any number of
journeymen or of master workmen to agree, on the one
part that they will not work below certain rates, or on
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the other part that they will not pay above certain
prices ; but that any association or combination for the
purpose of compelling journeymen or employers to conform
to any rule, regulation or agreement, fixing the rate
of wages, to which they are not parties, by the im-
position of penalties, by agreeing to quit the service
of any employer who employes a journeyman below certain
rates, unless the journeyman pays the penalty imposed by
the combination, or by threats, menaces, intimidation,
violence or other unlawful means, is a conspiracy for
which the parties entering into it may be indicted."
Pe v. Van Nostrand et al : (see Carson's "Law
of Crinimal Conspiracies") was a case which arose in
1867 under the same Revised Statute as People v. Fisher.
The defendants were convicted on an indictment for com-
bining, and striking in order to compel their employer
to discharge an apprentice in the bricklayer and masons
trade who was not a member of their society. The
defendants were held to have violated the statute for-
bidding a combination to do an act injurious to trade
or commerce.
In a civil action against several members of the
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defendants' society, the father of the boy forced out of
employment, recovered damages for loss of wages.
People v. Smith : The preceding cases arose under
Sec. 168 of the Penal Code before the passage in 1870 of
Section 170, authorizing co-operation to raise wages.
In People ex rel Gill v Smith, (10 N. Y. St. Rep.
730), which came before the court of Oyer and Terminer
in New York City on writs of habeas corpus and certiorari
it was held criminal under Sec. 168 of the Penal Code
for a committee of the Knights of Labor to demand the
discharge of employes because they would not join the
society, where the demand was made with a threat to
strike in case of non-compliance.
The Court held that Sec. 168, subs. 5 & 6 of the
Penal Code are limited by Sec. 170 only to the extent
of legalizing a peaceable and orderly strike when re-
sorted to in good faith for the authorized purposes.
Section 170 does not authorize a combination of individu-
als to compel by means condemned in Section 168, all
workingmen to join the co-operative forces or to punish
those who are supposed to be inimical thereto.
Judge Barrett said that where there is no relation,
direct, or indirect, between wages and strikes, the corn-
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bination which brings the latter about for unlawful
purposes is a criminal conspiracy. The strike then
involves the "diminishing of productive labor" which is
"an injury to the community and an act injurious to
trade."
Rogers v. Evarts,(17 N. Y. Sup. 264.),decided in
1891 in the Supreme Court of New York, may be said to lay
down the law pertaining to strikes as it exists to-day in
this state. The case came before the court on an ap-
plication by Rogers and other cigar manufacturers of
Binghamton for an injunction to restrain the defendants,
members of the executive committee of the striking cigar-
makers, from advising, aiding and encouraging others to
leave the plaintiffs' employment.
It was held lawful for the general committee of the
strikers to appoint certain persons, denominated "pick-
ets". to watch the factories, ascertain who were work-
ing there and to approach both those who had remained
at work, and those who had taken the place of the strik-
ers, and to endeavor to persuade them by arguments to
leave their employment in order to promote their mutual
interests and make the strike effective. It was held
lawful also for the "pickets," as an additional induce-
j 3
ment, to offer to indemnify those whom they approached
for any losses they should incur in leaving the employ-
ment.
It was held lawful for the strikers to post in
their public meeting place the names of the merchants who
refused to contributeupon solicitation, as well as those
who contributed, to the legitimate expenses of the
strikers.
There being no evidence of intimidation in the
efforts and arguments of the defendants to effect what
was held to be a lawful purpose ; i.e. the raising of
their wages, the injunction was refused.
Judge Walter Lloyd Smith in his able and lucid
opinion, repudiates the corrnon law doctrine, held in
England and same American states, of the liability of a
third party for inducing, by persuasion and entreaty a
servant to quit the employment of his employer. He
says : (After citing several authorities upholding the
doctrine) "But this doctrine although never overruled
has never, to my knowledge, been explicitly upheld in
this st ate.
I am not satisfied with the reason of the rule. x
x x x It is at least a matter of grave doubt whether
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such right of action will ever be sustained in this
state."
The judge points out that the combination of the
strikers to advance their wages is protected, by Section
170 of the Penal Code. But he says, "If the means
employed envolves trespass On any of the plaintiffs'
legal rights, then the co-operation ceases to be orderly
and the section of the Code becomes in-opera-
tive." He approves the doctrine of Walker v. Cronin,
107 Mass. 564, and Mogu Steamship Co. v. McGregor, 23
Q. B. Div. 598, which justifies a man in using all
reasonable and lawful means in the promotion of his own
business or interests, even though it result in the in-
jury or ruin of his rival, and exempts him from all lia-
bility for any damages which another may suffer as a
result of such lawful competition. The language of
Judge Barrett in People v.Kostka below, is also quoted
and approved.
The court continues : "The tendency of modern
thought and of judicial decision is to the enlargement
of the right of combination, whether of capital or of
labor. All re striction has not been removed ; but I
am not willing to hold that the combination which appears
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in this case, in itself and apart from the methods used,
is within the condemnation of the law as it is interpre-
ted by our courts. Irrespective of any statute, I think
the law now permits workmen, at least, within a limited
territory, to combine together and to seek any legitimate
advantage in their trade. The increase of wages is
such an advantage.
The right to combine,involves of necessity,the
right to persuade all co-laborers to join in the combi-
nation. This is but a corollary of the right of com-
bination. x x x x x
There may be cases, however, where persuasion and
entreaty are not lawful instruments to effect the pur-
poses of a strike. Even persuasion and entreaty may be
used in such a manner, with such persistency, and with
such environments as to constitute intimidation. Their
use then becomes a violation of law. x x x x
Whenever the strikers assume toward the employes
an attitude of menace,then persuasion and entreaty with
words, however smooth, may constitute intimidation which
will render those who use them liable to both the civil
and criminal law. "
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Section 3. Strikes and Boycottsunder the
Laws of the United States.
It is only within the last few years that the United
States Courtw have been called upon to interpret and ap-
ply the law to conspiracies involving strikes and boy-
cotts. Under the laws of the United States no con-
spiracies are criminal unless expressly declared so by
statute. The federal courts differ from the English
courts and the courts of most of the states in that they
consider no conspiracy criminal, however unlawful its
purpose,until some overt act has been done to carry out
the purpose of the conspiracy.
The cases involving labor troubles, strikes and boy-
cottshave been brought into the United States courts on
two grounds : (1) contempt of court in interfering with
a receiver operating a railroad under orders of the court,
and (2) violations of the United States statutes forbid-
ding any interference with the transportation of the
mails, and any contract, combination or conspiracy in
restraint of trade and commerce between the states or
with foreign nations. The federal courts have been
progressive in their interpretation of the statutes and
fearless in the application of the law as thus interpret-
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ed. They have left little room for doubt that they will
use their whole power when appealed to for the enforce-
ment of the law and the protection of life and property.
Their firm and decisive attitude has done much to bring
labor organizations and strike leaders to their caln
senses and a knowledge of the rights of others, and it
must be potent in preventing hasty or reckless outbreaks
of labor in the future.
United States Statutes. The laws of the United
States pertaining to the carriage of the mails which are
material to the present discussion, are as follows :
Section 3995 of the Revised Statutes originally enacted
March 3, 1825, reads :
"Any person who shall knowingly and wilully ob-
struct and retard the passage of the mail, or any car-
riage, horse, driver or carrier carrying the same, shall,
for every such offense, be punishable by a fine of not
more than one hundred dollars."
Section 3964 Rev. Stat. declares that "All railroads
or parts of railroads which are now or hereafter may be
in operation" are established post roads. Section 3, Act
off March 3, 1879, provides that the Postmaster General
shall, in all cases, decide on what trains and in what
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manner the mails shall be carried.
Section 4000 of the Revised Statutes provides that
"Every railway company carrying the mails shall carry
on any train which may run over its road, and without
extra charge therefor, all mailable matter directed to be
carried thereon, and the person in charge of the same".
The other United States Statutes involved in the
discussion of strikes and boycotts is the act of July
2, 1890, entitled, "An Act to protect trade and commerce
against unlawful restraints and monopolies," (26 St. p.
209, c. 647). The sections in question are as follows
"Section 1. Every contract, combination in the
form of trust or Otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint
of trade or commerce among the several states, or with
foreign nations, is hereby declared to be illegal.
Section 2. Every person who shall monopolize, or
attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any
other person or persons to monopolize, any part of the
trade or commerce among the several states or with for-
eign nat ions, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor,
and on conviction thereof shall be punished by a fine not
exceeding five thousand dollars, or by imprisonment not
exceeding one year, or by both said punishments, in the
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discretion of the court."
The interpretation of these laws by the courts and
their application to strikes and boycotts can be best
presented by a review of the leading cases arising un-
der them.
Section 4. Cases under United States Statutes.
The first case of importance is the United States
v. Patterson, et al, 55 Fed. 605, which came before the
Circuit Court for the district of Massachusetts, on Feb.
28, 1893. It arose on a demurrer to an indictment,
against Patterson and others, under the act of July 2,
1890. Judge Putnam decided that the words "trade" and
"commerce" as used in the act are synonomous, and he in-
terprets the statute as applying duly to combinations
and conspiracies which aim to restrain trade between the
states by engrossing, monopolizing or grasping the mar-
ket. He expressly guards against the broader interpre-
tation given to the statute later in U. S. v. Working-
men's Amalgamated Council of New Orleans, (94 Fed.Rep.
994) ; U. S. v. Debs (64 Fed. 763) ; and U. S. v. Cas-
s idy, (67 Fed. 698.) His language is as follows
"Careless or inapt construction of the statute as bear-
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ing on this case, while it may seem to create but a
small divergence here, will, if followed out logically,
extend into very large fields ; because if the propo-
sition made by the United States is taken with its full
force, the inevitable result will be that the federal
courts will be compelled to apply this statute to all
attempts to restrain commerce among the states, or com-
merce with foreign nations, by strikes or boycotts, or
by every method of interference by way of violence or
intimidation. It is not to be presumed that congress
intended thus to extend the jurisdiction of the courts
of the United States without very clear language. Such
language I do not find in the statute."
Unit'ed States v. Workingm nA!, Amalgamated Council
of New Orleans;
Within a month after the decision of Judge Putnam
in U. S. v. Patterson sup a directly contrary in-
terpretation was given to the act of July 2, 1890, by
Judge Billings, sitting in the circuit court for the
Eastern District of Louis iana,,in United States v.
Workingmens' Amagaated Council of New Orleans, 54 Fed.
994. The cause was submitted on an application for an
injunction to restrain the combined labor unions of New
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Orleans from obstructing and restraining interstate com-
merce. The facts in the case in brief were : A dif-
ference had sprung up between the warehousemen and their
employes and the principal draymen and their subordinates,
as to wages, hours and men to be employed. In order to
compel compliance on the part of the employers with the
demands of the employed, all the union men, under the di-
rection of the recognized officers of their various labor
associations, decided to discontinue business. One
part of their business was the transporting of goods
which were being conveyed from state to state, and to and
from foreign countries. In some branches of business
an effort was made to replace the union men by other
workmen. This was resisted by vast throngs of Union men
assembling in the streets, and in some instances by vio-
lence, so that as the result of the intended acts of the
strikers, not a bale of the goods constituting the com-
merce of the country could be moved. The mayor was
obliged to call upon the citizens to assist the police in
suppressing disorder ; and finally the governon called
out the militia to protect life and property from the
lawlessness of the strikers.
In reply to the contention of the defendants that
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the case did not fall within the purview of the statute,
which prohibited monopolies and combinations of capital-
ists, and not of laborers, said "I think that the con-
gressional debates show that the statute had its origin
in the evils of massed capital ; but, when the congress
came to formulating the prohibition x x x x x x x the
subject had so broadened in the minds of the legislators,
that the source of the evil was not regarded as material,
and the evil in its entirety is dealt with. They made
the interdiction include combinations of labor as well as
of capital ; in fact all combinations inrestraint of
commerce without regard to the character of the persons
who entered into them." After examiningother claims of
the defendants and reviewing the facts as stated above,
the court continued; "The question simply is, do these
facts establish a case within the statute ? It seems to
me this question is tantamount to the question, could
there be a case within the statute ? It is conceded
that the labor organizations were at the outset lawful.
But, when lawful forces are put into unlawful channels,-
i.e. when lawful associations adopt and further unlawful
purposes and do unlawful acts, - the associations them-
selves become unlawful. The evil, as well as the unlaw-
fulness, of the act of the defendants, consists in this
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that until certain demands of theirs were complied with,
they endeavored to prevent, ,and did prevent everybody
from moving the commerce of the country."
The court adopts the definition of C. J. Savage in
People v. Fisher, supra as to the meaning of "restraint
of trade", and concludes : "It is the successful effort
of the combination of the defendants to intimidate and
overawe others who were at work in conducting or carrying
on the commerce of the country, in which the court finds
their error and their violation of the statute. One
of the intended results of their combined action was the
forced stagnation of all the commerce which flowed through
New Orleans. x x x x x For these reasons I think the
injunction should issue."
The Pulman Strike. The great railroad strike of
1894, with its wide-spreading effects, brought home to
the public the great and pressing importance of the labor
question and it gave rise to some striking examples of
the use of injunction by the Federal courts, as a remedy
against the strike and boycott. It grew out of a disa-
greement between the Pulman Palace Car Company of Pulman,
Ill., and their large force of employes as to the rate of
wages. On May 11, 1894, the employes of the Pulman
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Company left the company's employ because of its refusal
to restore wages which had been reduced during the pre-
ceding year, and the works were then closed. In June,
1894, the American Railway Union, an organization com-
posed of railroad employes below a certain rank, boast-
ing a membership of 250,000, and strongly established
throughout the West, was in convention at Chicago. The
convention took the grievances of the Pulman employes un-
der consideration, and out of sympathy for what they held
to be the wrongs of the workmen, they voted on June 21st
to declare a boycott of the Pulman cars on all roads
centering in Chicago, and wherever the union was organiz-
ed, unless the differences at Pulman were settled within
five days. The officers of the Railway Union were author-
ized to announce the boycott and to order and direct a
strike if necessary to enforce it. The Pulman Company
having ignored the demands of the Railray Union, on June
26, President Eugene V. Debs issued orders to the members
of the union to refuse to handle Pulman cars on all the
roads. Most of these roads were bound by contract to
haul the cars of the Pulmnan Company, and therefore ins ist-
ed upon their employes handling them. When many workmen
were being discharged for their refusal to do their duty,
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the A. R. U., through its officers, ordered all its mem-
bers on the hostile roads to go out on strike until the
Pulman trouble should be settled and the discharged men
re ins tat ed.
Nearly all the roads entering Chicago and extending
to the Pacific coast were thus tied up. Passengers were
left wherever the train was abandoned, the mails were
delayed, transportation was obstructed, and trade and
commerce over a vast extent of territory were paralyzed
for many days.
The strikers congregated in mobs at the railroad
yards and resorted ti insults, and violence, to force
others to leave their employment and to prevent new men
from entering the employment which they had abandoned.
Trains were side-tracked, engines "killed",; the tracks
were completely blockaded ; cattle were left to die in
the yards, and hundreds of cars were overturned on the
tracks, and with their contents, given to the flames.
The police force was unable to suppress disorder and
protect property. The federal courts were appealed to
by the Railroad Companies, and on July 2, they issued an
injunction order under the act of July 2, 1890, enjoining
President Debs, Vice-President Howard, Secretary Keliher,
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Director Rogers and all others from interfering with the
United States mails, or restraining interstate commerce.
The strike leaders ignored the injunction by word
and act ; and it was only after the Federal troops had
been called in and several lives had been sacrificed, that
law and order were restored. Debs, Howard, Keliher and
others were arrested on warrant of attachment for con-
tempt, and on Dec. 14, 1894 were brought before Judge
Woods, in the Circuit Court for the Northern District of
Illinois.
United States v. Debs, et al, (64 Fed. 724). The
court, while arguing Strongly and at length that the
conspiracy charged against the defendants to hinder and
interrupt interstate commerce and the carriage of the
mails upon the railroads centering in Chicago, by the
means and in the manner indicated, was such a public nui-
sance as to warrant the Federal courts in restraining
it by the remedy of injunction, still expressly refrained
from establishing a precedent by resting its decision on
that ground.
Instead, the injunction was sustained on the grounds
upon which it was granted under the act of July 2, 1890.
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The court held, against the vigorous contentions of the
defendants, that that act, declaring it illegal and a
misdemeanor to enter into any contract, combination in the
form of trust, or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint
of trade and comnerce among the several states, or with
foreign nations, was intended to apply to combinations
and conspiracies of workingmen as well. as contracts and
combinations of capital ; and that the act expressly
authorized the equitable remedy of injunction by United
States courts for its enforcements.
The defendants were adjudged guilty of contempt in
persisting in their conduct and disobeying the injunction
wnd were accordingly sentenced to one year's imprisonment.
Thus, through the elastic powers of a court of equity, the
ambitious and arrogant President Debs and his colleagues,
who assumed to dictate to the employers of labor, who
connived at disorder which they pretended to discourage,
and who threatened to bring capital to its knees and to
paralize the commerce of the country, were brought to pay
the penalty of their ambition arid rashness in a prison
cell.
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In re Debs. The case of United States v Debs supra
was carried before the United States Supreme Court on a
petition for a writ of Habeas Corpus. (In re Debs 158
U. S. 564. Decided May 27, 1895.) The writ was refused
on the ground that "the circuit court having full
jurisdiction in the premises, its findings as to the act
of disobedience are not open to review on habeas corpUs
in this or any other court." In an elaborate and able
opinion by Justice Brewer, the Supreme Court sustained
the authority and action of the circuit court in granting
an injunction against the obstruction of the mails and
interstate commerce and in punishing for contempt, those
who disobeyed the order.
In summing up his conclusions the court said : "We
hold that the government of the United States is one hav-
ing jurisdiction of every part of soil within its terri-
tory, and acting. directly on each citizen ; that while
it is a government of enumerated powers, it has within
the limits of those powers all the attributes of sover-
cignty, that to it is committed power over interstate
commerce and the transmission of the mails ; that the
powers thus conferred upon the national government are
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not dormant, but have been assumed and put into practical
exercise by the legislation of Congress ; that in the
exercise of those powers it is competent for the govern-
ment to remove all obstruction on highways, natural or
artificial, to the passage of interstate commerce or the
carrying of the mails ; that while it may he competent
for the government (through the executive branch and in
the use of the entire executive power of the nation) to
forcibly remove all such obstructions, it is equally
within its competency to appeal to the civil courts for
an inquiry and determination as to the existence and char-
acter of any alleged obstructions, and if such are found
to exist, or threaten to occur, to invoke the powers of
those courts to remove or restrain such obstructions ;
that the jurisdiction of the courts to interfere in such
matters by injunction is one recognized from ancient
times and by indubitable authority ; . . . . . . . . . .
that under the complaint made, the circuit court had
power to issue its process of injunction, that it having
been issued and served on these defendants, the Circuit
Court had power to inquire whether its orders had been
disobeyed, and when it found that they had been, then to
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proceed under section 725, Rev. St., which grants power
to punish by fine or imprisonment, . . disobedience .
by any party . . . or other person to any lawful writ,
order, rule, decree or command, and enter the order of
punishment complained of." . .
The court expressly refrained from examining the act
of July 2, 1890, upon which the Circuit Court relied
mainly to sustain its injunction, explaining that while
they did not dissent from the conclusions of the lower
court as to the scope of that act, they preferred to rest
their judgment on the broader grounds discussed in the
opinion.
Thomas v. Railway Co. Thomas v. Railway Co., in
re Phelan (62 Fed. 803) was another important case grow-
ing out of the Pulman boycott and strike of 1894. It
came before the Circuit Court for the southern district
of Ohio on July 13, 1894, some months earlier than the
case of United States v. Debs supra, at Chicago. In the
suit of Thomas v. Cincinnati, New Orleans and Texas
Pacific Railway Company, Samuel M. Felton was appoint-
ed receiver. This case now arose on a petition filed
by this receiver for the commitment of F. W. Phelan
for contempt and for an injunction against him, for inter-
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fering with the operation of the receiver's road.
The testimony showed that Phelan the contemnor came
to Cincinnati on June 24th, under orders of President
Debs of the A.R. U., to take charge of the contemplated
Pulman boycott on the roads entering that city. He
made numerous speeches before meetings of the employes
of the railroads, including those of the receiver, ad-
vising and inciting them to go out on strike, 'and to pre-
vent all others from taking their places, by persuasion,
if possible, by clubbing if necessary. He organized
a city committee of working men to assist him in con-
ducting the strike. Most of the railroads entering
Cincinnati were tied up, mails were delayed, freight
traffic was practically stopped, interstate commerce inter.
rupted and restrained, and the receiver of the Cincinnati
Southern, the petitioner, was put to great trouble and
expense to secure and maintain armed protection for his
employes. The learned Judge Taft, in an elaborate opin-
ion, granted the petition on the ground that any wilful
attempt, with knowledge that a railroad is in the hands
of a court, to prevent the receiver thereof appointed by
the court from complying with the order of the court in
running the road, which is unlawful, and which, as
between private individuals would give a right of action
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for damages, is a contempt of the order of the court.
The judge pointed out that it was lawful for the em-
ployes of the receiver, as well as any other employes to
organize and act together, for the promotion of their
own interest ; to quit the employment of the receiver
if they wished, or for Phelan to advise and induce them
to quit the employment, so long as their acts were peace-
able and in pursuance of a lawful purpose. But he held
that maliciously inciting the employes of all the Cin-
cinnati roads to leave their employment, not on account
of any grievance of their own, but in the furtherance
of an unlawful conspiracy, was an unlawful wrong, for
which Phelan was liable to the employers for damages, and
for which, as far as his acts affected the road of the re-
ceiver, he was in contempt of court.
The combination of Debs, Phelan and the directors of
the A.R.U. was held to be unlawful on the grounds, (1)
that it sought to compel the railroad companies to break
their contracts with Pulman, (2) that it was a boycott
to inflict pecuniary injury on Pulman, and on the roads
that refused to break their contracts with him, (3) that
it interfered with the mails, and (4) that it paralyzed
interstate commerce.
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Phelan was sentenced to six months in jail for his
contempt.
United States v. Cassidy (67 Fed. 698.) was another
great case which grew out of the big Pulman strike.
It was a trial in the United States Circuit Court
for the northern district of California on an indictment
against Cassidy, Mayne and others, under Rev. St. Section
5440 and the act of July 2, 1890 for conspiracy to corrmit
offenses against the United States, namely the offense of
obstructing the mails of the United States, and the
offense of combining and conspiring to restrain trade and
commerce between the states and with foreign countries.
The charge delivered by Judge Morrow in this case is
believed to be the longest ever delivered in a criminal
case in this country, and only exceeded in any case by
the charge of Lord Chief Justice Cockburn in the Tichborne
Case. The trial occupied five months, from Nov. 12, 1894
to April 6, 1895. While only two of the defendants were
tried, the case was treated as a test case both by the
government and by the strikers, and it involved as a
practical result the disposition of some 4.32 cases.
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The judge said that although the statute against
obstructing the mails was passed before the establishment
of railroads and its phraseology conformed to the con-
ditions of that time, yet it protects alike the transpor-
tation of the mail by the "limited express", as it does
the carriage by the old fashioned stage coach.
He continues : "Recurring to section 3995 of the
Revised Statutes, and you will observe that the statute
applies to those persons who knowingly and willfully
obstruct and retard the passage of the mails, or the
carrier carrying the same ; that is to say to those who
know that the acts performed, however innocent they may
otherwise be, will have the effect of obstructing and
retarding the passage of the mail, and they perform the
acts with the intention that such shall be the operation."
(Citing United States vrKirby, 7 Wall,485). He approves
the language of Thomas v.Railway Co. (62 Fed. 822),that it
would be no defense under this statute that the obstruc-
tion was effected by merely quitting employment, where the
motive for quitting was to retard the mails and had
nothing to do with the terms of employment.
"The statute also applies to persons who, having in
view the accomplishment of other purposes, perform unlaw-
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ful acts which have the effect of obstructing and retard-
ing the passage of the mails. In such case, an intent
to obstruct and retard the mails will be imputed to the
authors of the unlawful act, although the attainment of
other ends may have been their primary object." (Citing
United States v Kirby, 7 Wall 485)
In regard to the second offense charged in the in-
dictment under the act of July 2, 1890, against conspir-
acies in restraint of trade and commerce, the court re-
jected the language of Judge Putnam in United States v.
Patterson, (55 Fed. 605), that the term "trade" and
"commerce" as used in the statute are synonymous, charged
that the word "commerce" as used in that act and in the
constitution, of the United States, has a broader meaning
than the word "trade". and that co4smerce among the states
consists of intercourse anf traffic between their citizens
and includes the transportation of persons and property
as well as the purchase, sale and exchange of commodities.
"Pulman cars,in use upon the roads,' are instrumentalities
of commerce, and while the primary object of the statute
was doubtless to prevent the destruction of legitimate and
healthy competition in interstate commnerce, by engrossing
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and monopolizing the markets for the commodities, yet
its provisions, are broad enough to reach a combination
or conspiracy that will interrupt the transportation of
such commodities and persons from one state to another,
While acknowledging the rights of employes of railway
companies to organize for mutual benefit and protection
and for the purpose of securing the highest wages and the
best conditions they can command, the court declared it
unlawful for them to ccnbine and quit work for the purpose
of compelling their employer to withdr'amw from his rela-
tions with a third party, for the purpose of injuring
that third party, (following Thomas v.Railway Co, 62 Fed.
817.)
After reviewing the voluminous testimony as to the
conduct of the strikers, and examining the leading
federal court decisions in analogous cases, the court
announces as law, the proposition that a strike, or a
preconcerted quitting of work, by a combination of rail-
way employes, is in itself unlawful, if the concerted
action is knowingly and willingly directed by the parties
to it for the purpose of obstructing and retarding the
passage of the mails, or in restraint of trade or
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commerce among the states.
NOTE. The jury,after deliberating four days and
nights failed to agree and were discharged. On the final
ballot, 10 jurymen voted for conviction and two for
acquittal, upon the count for conspiracy to retard the
mails, and eight for conviction and four for acquittal,
on the count for conspiracy to obstruct and interfere
with interstate commerce.
78
Chapter III.
B 0 Y C 0 T T S.
Section I. Definition.
Black's Law Dictionary defines the boycott to be
"A conspiracy formed and intended directly or indirectly
to prevent the cayrying on of any lawful business, or to
injure the business of anyone by wrongfully preventing
those who would be customers from buying anything from,
or employing the representatives of said business, by
threats, intimidation or other forcible means."
Anderson's Law Dictionary says it is "A combination
between persons to suspend or discontinue dealings or
patronage with another person or persons because of a
refusal to comply with a request of him or them. The
purpose is to constrain acquiesence or to force sub-
mission on the part of the individual, who, by non-com-
pliance with the demand, has rendered himself obnoxious
to the immediate parties, and, perhaps to their per-
sonal and fraternal associates."
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0ri gin of the t erm . The real meaning of the
term may be gathered somewhat from the circumstances of
its origin.
These circumstances are narrated by Mr. Justin H.
McCarthy, the Irish parliamentarian and writer, in his
book entitled, "England under Gladstone" as follows :
"The strike was supported by a form of action, or
rather inaction, which soon became historical. Captain
Boycott was an Englishman, an agent of Lord Earne, and
a farmer of Lough Mask, in the wild and beautiful
district of Connemara. In his capacity as agent he had
served notices upon Lord Earne's tenants, and the tenants
suddenly retaliated in the most unexpected way by, in the
language of schools and society, sending Captain Boycott
to Coventry in a very thorough manner. The population
of the region for miles around resolved not to I-ve any-
thing to do with him, and, as far as they could prevent
it, not to allow any one else to have anything to do
with himn. His life appeared to be in danger ; he had
to claim police protection. His servants fled from him
as servants flee from their masters in some plague
stricken Italian city. The awPIul sentence of excom-
munication could hardly have rendered him more helplessly
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alone for a time ; no one would work for him ; no one
would supply him with food. He and his wife had to
work in their own fields themselves, in most unpleasant
imitation of the Theocritian shepherds and shepherdesses,
and play out their grim eclogue in their deserted fields,
with the shadows of armed constabulary ever at their
heels. The Orangemen of the north heard of Captain
Boycott and his sufferings, and the way in which he was
holding his ground, and they organized assistance and
sent him down armed laborers from Ulster. To prevent
civil war, the authorities had to send a force of
soldiers and police toLough Mask, and Captain Boycott's
harvests were brought in, and his potatoes dug, by the
armed Ulster laborers, guarded always by the little
army. "
In Casey v. Cincinnati Tpographical Union below, it
is said that the boycott is itself a threat. The court
in the Connecticut case of State v. Glidden (55 Conn. 46)
said that the term in its original meaning "signifies
violence if not murder." In the notable Virginia case
(Cruxnp v.The Cormonwealth, 84 Va. 927. ) the court said :
"The essential idea of boycotting, whether in Ireland or
the United States, is a confederation whose intent is
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to injure another by preventing any and all persons from
doing business with him, through fear of incurring the
displeasure, persecution and vengeance of the conspira-
tors."
The incidents described by Mr. Mc Carthy occurred in
the year 1882. While the name is of recent origin the
offense is as old as English law reports, and it was a
punishable conspiracy at Common Law, Nor has the con-
spiracy for that purpose been confined to workingmen.
The acts of the brewers in the case of Kin v. Star_..
ling (Tubwomen v. Brewers of London) supra. constituted
a boycott. The purpose of their conspiracy was to
ruin the farmers of the excise by pauperizing them, ren-
dering them unable to pay the king's revenue and turning
the hostility of the poor people of London into mob
violence against them.
In Mogul Steamship C6., v. McGregor (15 Q. B. Div.
476 ; 23 Q. B. Div. 598) the conspiracy of the defendants,
a Steamship Co., was to drive the plaintiff out of the
carrying trade by means of the boycott.
They sent circulars to the patrons of the plaintiff
engaged in the tea trade in China, not ifying them that
if they continued to ship b the plaintiff's line, the
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defendants would deny them the benefits of any future
dealings with them. The effect was to ruin the business
of the plaintiff,, but the defendants were excused on
the ground that their acts were in the legitimate pursuit
and furtherance of their own business, and not malicious
or designed primarily to injure the plaintiff.
Plaintiffs' injury and loss was held to be the result of
legitimate competition. However Lord Coleridge wrote
a strong dissenting opinion.
Other competing business enterprises have resorted
to the boycott.
The boycott then, was not primarily nor essentially
a feature of labor troubles, nor confined in its use to
workingmen. Most strikes embraee some of the character-
istics of the boycott, for when men have gone out on
strike, it is to their interest to prevent the employers'
conducting his business without them. However it has
often of late years been the con-comitant of nearly
all important strikes, and it is in that relation, and
often on account of the threats and intimidation by
which it was sought to be enforced that it has come most
frequently under the cognizance of the cou~ts.
A review of the leading American cases involving it
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will best explain its legal status in this country.
Section 2 Cases on Boycotts.
Pe v Wil~ig : The case of People v. Wilzig,
(4 N. Y. Crim. Reports, 403), Tried at Oyer and Tert-
miner in New York City in June 1886, was a trial of the
defendants on an indictment for extortion by a wrongful
use of force or fear, under Sections 552, 553, Penal
Code. The extortion charged was to pay the expenses of
a boycott against the prosecutor, and was extorted by a
threat to Continue the boycott perpetually in case of
non-compliance with the demands of the defendants.
The facts in brief were as follows --
The complainant, Geo. Theiss, was the owner and
manager of a large building in East Fourteenth Street,
New York City, used as a concert hall and restaurant.
He had an orchestra of thirteen pieces, and employed a
large number of waiters, bartenders and other various
attaches. His son was his head bartender, and the
leader of his orchestra was a man whom he had known for
ten years and who had been associated with him in
business. The accumulations of a lifetime, almost
$300,000, were invested in this establishinent.
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The defendants, Paul Wilzig of Waiters' Union,
No. 3 ; Max Dannhauser and Hans Holdorf, of the Carl
Sahm Club ; Strop and Rosenburg of Bartenders' Union,
No. 1 ; O'Leary of the Knights of Labor and Beddles, of
the Central Labor Union, came to Mr. Theiss' place and
informed him that he should discharge his waiters, or-
chestra, and bartenders and employ only help belonging
to their respective clubs and unions, and at wages fixed
by these unions. Mr. Theiss replied that he did not
feel like discharging his son, his brother-in-law, and.
other faithful and satisfactory servants ; but since they
did not belong to the unions, the defendants insisted
that he should discharge them.
Finally, they informed Theiss that if he did not
comply with their demands within twenty-four hours, a
boycott would be placed upon his business. At the end
of the twenty-four hours, Mr. Theiss not having complied
with the demands of the defendants, the b.oycott was or-
dered on.
He found a body of men walking up and down before
his place of business, wearing old hats pasted over with
libelous circulars headed "boycott," announcing to the
public that Theiss was a foe of organized labor,
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calling on all people to abstain from visiting his place,
and charging him with being an obscure man. The circu-
lar was signed by the boycott commnittee of the Central
Labor Union. The circulars were borne on the backs of
the procession. A large crowd assembled to witness this
strange proceeding, and made it difficult and dangerous
for people to visit this place of ammusement. Men under
the direction of the defendants went inside and posted
the libelous circulars on the tables, in the closets,
and on the frescoed walls. An attempt was made to paste
a circular on the back of Theiss' son while crossing the
street. The iron and glass roof of the building was
raised. They brought in an infernal machine and set
fire to it, creating such a stinch that business had to
be suspended for four hours.
Thus the boycott was continued every afternoon and
evening for fifteen days, the fifty or more men who were
engaged in it being refreshed or relieved, as need be,
under the directions of the defendants. Then they went
to Mr. Shultz, of whom Theiss purchased his mineral
waters, and demanded of him that he should sell Theiss
no more goods under penalty of himself being boycotted.
He yielded and refused to supply Mr. Theiss with mineral
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water.
The defendants then demanded of Mr. Ehret, of whom
Mr. Theiss bought his beer, the staple of' his tradethat
he should furnish Mr. Theiss no more beer, They in-
formed him that if he did continue to supply beer to
Mr. Theiss they would boycott his beer by the Knights
of Labor throughout the United States. Moved by this
threat, Mr. Ehret brought Mr. Theiss, and a representa-
tive of each class of his employes to his brewery where
they met the defendants and heard their demand. Mr.
Theiss labored long to protect his seventy-five faithful
employes. But Mr. Ehret, fearing the boycott of his
beer, labored with Mr. Theiss, and after holding out
eight hours , he yielded to the demands of the
defendants, and agreed to discharge his old help and
employ only members of the organizations which the boycott
leaders represented, and at their scale of wages. The
defendants then demanded that Mr. Theiss should pay
them $1000,OO as the expenses of the boycott. When
he protested against this exaction, they threatened him
that if he did not pay at once the Knights of Labor would
order a perpetual boycott so that he could not carry on
business anywhere in the civilized world. Under these
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threats he yielded and paid the $1000.00 in a check
which the defendants had cashed and divided the proceeds
among themselves.
Justice Barrett, in his charge to the jury, said :
"Let us see what workingmen trying to better their
condition may lawfully do, and what they may not law-
fully do. The law is tender of their rights. x x x
Now it has been legislatively decreed that
the orderly and peacable assembling or co-operation of
persons employed in any calling, trade or handicraft,
for the purpose of obtaining an advance in the rate of
wages and compensation, or of maintaining such rate, is
not a conspiracy. (Penal Code 170). This is what
laboring men may lawfully do. What they may not do is
to combine together to prevent other people from working
at prices to suit themselves."
After conceding the right of laboring men to go a-
round peaceably among their friends and persuade them to
withdraw their patronage from the man who injures them
or refuses to do them justice, he says : "It is one
thing for a man or men to go about and talk to their
friends, but it is quite another thing for fifty or sixty
or one hundred men to band together not for the purpose
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of indivudual persuasion, but to bring the power of com-
bination to bear in an unlawful way to injure the em-
ployerts buisness. x x x x x Now, the law says that
that may not be done if the persons so engaged use force,
threats or intimidation. Let us see what is meant by
this word intimidation. The defendants' counsel seem to
have the idea that if a body of men, however large,
operating in the manner suggested only avoids acts of
physical violence, they are within the law, and that the
employers business may be ruined with impunity so long as
no blow is struck, nor actual threat by word of mouth
uttered. This is an error. The men who walk up and
down in front. of a man's shop may be guilty of intimida-
tion, though they never raise a finger or utter a
word. Their attitude nevertheless may be that of
menace. They may intimidate by their numbers, their
methods, their placards, their circulars and their de-
vices."
The jury brought in verdicts of guilty, and the de-
fendants were sentenced to hard labor in States Prison
for periods varying from a year and six months to three
years and eight monthe.
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Peo vKostka(4 N. Y. Crin. Rep.), 429, was tried
in the same court and before the same judge as People v.
Wil supra. It came before the court in July 1886,
only one week later than the Wilzig case.
It differed from the latter case in that it was a
trial of the defendants on an indictment under Sec, 168,
Subd. 5 of the Penal Code, for interfering with the
peaceable pursuit of the prosseutors business by boycott-
ing, picketing, etc., while the main issue in the Wilzig
case was that of extortion to which the boycott had been
preliminary and auxiliary. The facts of the case in
brief are as follows :--
The prosecutor, one Josephine Landgraff, carried on
the baker business in a small way in the City of New
York. The defendants, who were in her employ, becoming
dissatisfied with the rate of wages, or because some
proscribed person was employed, or for some other cause,
which the witnesses, being foreigners, did not seem able
or willing to make clear, left the employment, an% at-
tempted to injure the employer's business by assembling,
sometimes to the number of fifteen before her shop and
distributing printed circulars declaring a boycott, set-
ting forth the grievances of the boycotters and calling
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on the widow's customers to withhold their trade. There
was also evidence that one of the defendants threatened
the life of one of Mrs. Landgraff's faithful employes,
and that some of them spat in the faces of some of her
bakers, and indulged in other acts of violence.
Judge Barrett in his charge to the jury after laying
down the law as in the case of People v.Wil supra, as
to the extent to which workmen could legally go in the
promotion of their interests, said in regard to intimida-
tion :--
"The mere fact that no violence was actually used in
the street is not conclusive. It is for you to say
whether the attitude of these men was threatening. Nor
is it necessary that there should have been a direct
threat. If you believe that the attitude actually pre-
sented by the distributors of those circulars was an
attitude of intimidation, either to the passers-by, or
to the woman inside (Mrs. Landgraff), considering all
the circumstances, then all who participated in it di-
rectly or indirectly, are within the meaning of that
word as used in the conspiracy act.
X X x X x x X X x X
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If the conspiracy here be established and the effect
of the overt acts was to intimidate and by such intimi-
dation to warn of f Mrs. Landgraff's customers and the
general public which might otherwise patronize her, and
to intimidate her, then such of the defendants as so
conspired and participated in the overt acts are guilty."
Most of the defendants were indicted ard sentenced
for periods varying from ten to thirty days.
Crump v.The Commonwealth, (84 Va. 927) is a leading
case on "boycott" which was brought before the Supreme
Court of Appeals of Virginia in 1888.
It came up on error in an indictment against Crump
for conspiring with others to boycott the business of
Baughman Bros.
The evidence of the case shows that while Baughman
Bros. were engaged in their business as stationers and
printers, the plaintiff in error and other members of
the Richmond Typographical Union, No. 90, a branch of
the Knights of Labor, conspired to compel Baughman Bros.
to make their office a "Union Office" and to employ only
printers belonging to the said union. Upon the re-
fusal of Baughman Bros. to comply with this demand the
Union decided to boycott the firm, as they had threatened
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to do, and they sent circulars to a great many of the
customers of the firm informing them that they had,
"with the aid of the Knights of Labor and all the trades
organizations in this city (Richmond) boycotted the es-
tablishment of Messrs. Baughman Bros: ; and formally
notifying the said customers that the names of all per-
sons who should persist in trading, patronizing, or deal-
ing with Baughman Bros. , after being duly notifyed of
the boycott, would be published weekly in the Labor
Herald as a "black list," and that they, in turn would
be boycotted until they agreed to withdraw their patron-
age from Baughman Bros. The threat was carried out.
For months Baughman Bros.,their employes and customers
were mercilessly hounded by publication after publica-
tion in the Labor Herald, (the organ of the boycotters),
whereby it was attempted to excite public feeling against
them, and to prevent the employes of the "rat" firm from
obtaining even board and shelter. The names of custo-
mers and patrons of the firm, includ1ig boarding houses,,
public schools and railroads and steamboat companies,
were published under the standing head of "black list."
Space will ixt permit quotations from these "incendiary"
publi cat ions.
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After reviewing these facts the court concluded its
opinion by saying : "It was proved that the conspirators
declared their set purpose and persistant effort to
"crush" Baughman Bros.--thereby causing them to lose
from one hundred and fifty to two hundred customers and
$10,000 net profits. The acts alleged and proved in
this case are unlawful and incompatible with the prosper-
ity, peace and civilization of the country ; and if they
can be perpetrated with impunity, by combinations of
irresponsible cabals or cliques, there will be an end
of government, and of society itself. Freedom--indi-
vidual and associated,-- is the boasted policy and
peculium of our country : but it is liberty regulated by
law ; and the motto of the law is ; Sic utere tuo, ut
alienum non leadas' "
Casey v.Cincinnati Typographical Union (45 Fed.
135) came before the United States Circuit Court in 1890,
on an application by the plaintiff, proprietor and pub-
lisher of the Comonwealth, a weekly paper published at
Covington, Ky., for an injunction restraining the boycott
which the defendants had declared against him for re-
fusing to "unionize" his office, i.e. employ only union
men at union prices. The purpose of the boycott was
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to destroy the circulation of the newspaper arid its
vilue as an advertising medium. It was conducted by
circulating handbills and publishing notices in the
Union Bulletin of Cincinnati calling upon workingmen and
all friends of organized labor to withdraw their patron-
age from Mr. Casey's business, and by sending circulars
to merchants requesting then to withdraw their sub-
scriptions and advertisements from the Comionwealth as a
condition of retaining the good will and patronage of
organized labor.
The temporary injunction was granted restraining
both the boycott and the publication of the notices and
circulars, although there had been no violence and no
threats to do anything unlawful.
Old Dominion SteamshipCo.,v. McKenna, et al. (30
Fed. 48), 1887, it was held that where the defendants,
styling themselves the "Executive Board of the Ocean
Association of the Longshoremen's Union, for the purpose of
obtaining such a rate of wages as they demanded, de-
cdared a boycott of the plaintiff's business, and at-
tempted to prevent the plaintiff from carrying on its
business as a cornon car'rier, and endeavored to stop all
dealings of other persons with the plaintiff, by sending
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threatening notices to its various customers and patrons
designed to intimidate them and deter them from having
any dealings with the plaintiff ; such acts were not
only illegal, rendering the defendants liable in damages,
but also misdemeanors at comnon law as well as by Sec.,
168 of the Penal Code of New York State.
Brace Bros., v.Evans (3 R. and Corp. Law J. 561)
grew out of an attempt of the Knights of Labor to force
the plaintiffs, managers of a steam laundry at Wilkins-
burg, Pa., to reinstate certain employes whom they had
discharged. After their refusal to comply, circulars
were issued alleging abusive treatment of the employes
by the plaintiffs and asking all persons to cease patron-
izing them. Some of the circulars were printed in
large letters "Boycott Brace Bros. "  Their customers
were sought out and asked not to patronize them. Men
followed plaintiff's wagons in buggies, having banners
attached to the harnesses on either side, bearing the
admonition "Boycott Brace Bros." When the plaintiff's
agents refused to cease to represent them, they were
themselves boycotted. Noisy crowds assembled around
their doors destributing circulars, until the police were
obliged to interfere. The agents of plaintiffs were
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finally obliged to decline to represent them. Many of
their customer&-withdrew their patronage and the loss to
their business from boycott was $600.00 per week.
A preliminary injuction was granted restraining
the conduct of the boycotters.
State v. Glidden . The leading case of State v.
Glidden et al (55 Conn. 47.), came before the Supreme
Court of Connecticut, in 1887, on an appeal from error
of the superior court on conviction of the defendant
for unlawful conspiracy. A new trial was refused. The
defendants, members of a typographical union, had noti-
fied the Carrington Publishing Co. of New Haven, pub-
lishers of the Journal and Courrier newspaper, to dis-
charge their employees and to hire the defendants and
their associates of the union instead. They had
threatened them that, upon non-compliance with the re-
quest, they would boycott their business by inducing
subscribers, advertisers and others to withdraw their
patronage. They also warned the company that the union
was affiliated with other unions and associations of the
city,all of whom would unite in boycotting the company
if they did not yield to the defendants' demand. There
was testimony that the defendants endeavored to induce
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and compel others to withdraw theirrIpatronage from the
company, and that Glidden had distributed circulars,
printed in large letters : "A word to the wise is suf--
ficient ; boycott the Journal and Courrier". The
defendants had also declared that the Carrington Company
would have to pay the expenses of the boycott. The
court held that these acts fell within the prohibition
of the statute of 1878 which provides that "Every person
who shall threaten or use any means to intimidate any
person, to compel such person against his will, to do
or abstain from doing any acts which such person had a
legal right to do, or shall persistently follow such per-
sons in a disorderly manner, or injure or threaten to
injure his property with intent to intimidate him, shall
upon conviction be liable to a fine not exceeding $100.,
or imprisonment in the county jail for six months."
The court said, inter alia ; "Defendants' purpose was
to deprive the publishing company of its liberty to
carry on its own bl]siness in its own way, although in
doing so it interferred with no right of the defendants.
The motive was to gain an advantage unjustly and at the
expense of others and therefore it was l egally corrupt.
As a means of accomplishing the purpose the parties in-
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tended to harm the publishing company and therefore it
was malicious.,, The. court, after quoting Mr.McCarthy's
explanation of the origin of the term"boycott" as given
above, said that the word signified violence, if not
murder, and that there would be no doubt of the criminal
intent if the word was used in its original sense. The
court added, however, that it preferred to believe that
the word was used in a modified sense and with a milder
meaning,and that if thus used it might not have been
cr iminal.
In another Connecticut case, Com v. Opdyke and Wal-
lace, (10 N. Y. St. Bar Ass. 158.), the court found the
defendants, superintendents of two railroads, guilty of
the common law offence of conspiracy for entering into a
mutual agreement to use all their influence to prevent
any person objectionable to either defendant, from
obtaining employment with either railroad company.
Con. v. 0'Keef, (10 N.Y.St. Bar Ass.160.): This
was a late Massachusetts case which arose on an indict-
ment against 0'Keef and other members of the Knights of
Labor for conspiracy to boycott Harrington & Co., leather
maniufacturers, by compelling or inducing one Emery,
through his employees, not to purchase any leather of
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Harrington & Co. not manufactured by the work of
Knights of Labor. Chief Justice Brigham, in his charge
to the jury, after defining the equal rights of workmen
to control their own labor and of manufacturers to con-
duct their own business as they please, says : "Such
being the respective rights of laborers, employers and
manufacturers, any interference of either with the
stated rights of the other, by fraudulent or forcible
means, that is to say, means that were physically con-
trolling and coercive, or morally controlling and coer-
cive, by reason of a personal or official influence
which the persons using that influence knew that they
could use upon the persons to whom they intended to ap-
ply that influence, so that it would have the force and
effect of coercion and compulsion, in whatever form of
words that compulsion should be expressed, would be un-
lawful and criminal ; and if two or more persons com-
bined to use such means they would be guilty of a crimin-
al conspiracy.
The state of Minnesota has taken a more lenient
attitude toward strikes and boycotts than any of the
other states. In the recent case of Bohn Mfg. Co.v.
Hollis, (54 Minn.223), the court said that any man
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(unless under contract obligation, or unless his em-
ployment charges him with sane public duty) has a
right to refuse to work for or to deal with any man or
class of men, as he sees fit ; and this right, which
one man may exercise singly any number may agree to
exercise jointly.
The Pulman Boycott : The Pulman Boycott (see U.S.
v. Debs supra.) surpassed all previous efforts of labor
organizations in the vastness of its proportions. It
brought the conspiracy of boycotting squarely before the
United States Courts, and gave them a chance to brand it
unmistakably with their disapproval, and condemnation.
In Thomas v.Railway Co. supra., the views of the Federal
courts in regard to the boycott features of the great
Pulman strike are well expressed by Judge Taft. He
said : "The combination was unlawful without respect
to the contract feature. It was a boycott. The em-
ployes of the railway companies had no gruevance against
their employers. Handling and hauling Pulman cars did
not render the ir service any more burdensome. They had
no complaint against the use of Pulman cars, as cars.
They came into no natural relation with Pulman in hand-
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ling the cars. He paid them no wages. He did not
regulate their hours or in any way determine their ser-
vices. Simply to injure him in his business, they were
incited and encouraged to compel the railway companies
to withdraw custom from him by threats of quitting their
service, and by actually quitting their. service. They
inflicted a loss upon the companies that was very great,
and it was unlawful because it was without lawful
excuse.
All the employes had a right to quit their employw-
ment, but they had no right to combine to quit in order
thereby to compel their employer to withdraw from a
mutually profitable relation with a third person, when
the relation thus sought to be broken had no effect
whatever on the character or reward of their service.
It is the motive for quitting and the end sought thereby
that makes the injury inflicted unlawful, and the com-
bination by which it is effected an unlawful conspiracy.
The distinction between an ordinary lawful and peaceable
strike entered upon to obtain concessions in the terms of
the strikers employment and a boycott is no fanciful
one, or one which needs the power of fine distinction to
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determine which is which. Every laboring man recognizes
the one or the other as quickly as the lawyer or the
judge. The combination under discussion was a boycott.
x x x Boycotts though unaccompanied by violence or in-
timidation have been pronounced unlawful in every state
of the United States where the question has arisen,
unless it be Minnesota ; and they are held to be unlaw-
ful in England."
The cases which have come before the federal courts
have been serious and the language of the decisions is
correspondingly strong. It will be noted that all boy-
cotts which have come under the cognizance of the courts
have been accompanied by intimidation ,either physical or'
moral, and their condemnation by the courts has been
grounded mainly on these unlawful means of enforcement.
It may be impossible for a boycott to be enforced with-
out the use of intimidation or threats of sane kind or de-
gree. But the courts of New York,Connecticut and Massa-
chusetts have intimated, and the court of Minnesota has
plainly asserted, that ifsa boycott should be declared
by workingmen against their employer to obtain some just
concession,and should be conducted by persuasion and
other peaceable means, without intimidation,physical or
moral,such boycott would not be unlawful.
103
Statutes : The boycott has beenas yetthe sub-
ject of but little expressed legislation, though there
is pressing need that the offence be clearly defined.
The following states, however, declare it a criminal
offence either by specific reference to it or by statutes
against threats and intimidation : Colorado, Illionois,
New Hampshire, New York, North Dakota, Oregon, Rhode
Island, South Dakota, Texas, Vermont and Wisconsin.
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Chapter IV.
R F M E D I E S.
Section 1. Civil Remedies.
At Law : There is no civil remedy either
at law or in equity against a workman who quits his em-
ployment or a master who discharges his workman, unless
this is done in violation of a contract existing between
the parties. If there is a contract for labor and em-
ployment existing between the parties, each is liable to
the other in a civil action for any damages resulting
from a violation of that contratt, (Anson on Contracts,
etc.)
In England it was laid down in the noted case of
Lumley v. Guy(2 F. & B. (Q. B.),) that an action for
damages wouldlie for enticing away a servant or enducing
a workman to break his contract of employment. This
doctrine has been followed in many subsequent English
cases and may be said to be the law in England. The
doctrine has been much questioned in this country and
much narrowed in its application.
The cases in most of the states are now agreed that
no act ion will lie for indtucing the breach of a contract
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of employment by peaceable and lawful means but that
where workmen combine to coerce their employer unlaw-
fully, or where they employ threats, intimidation, force,
or violence to compel workmen to leave their employment,
or to prevent them from entering into employment, they
are liable in a civil action for all damages resulting
fran such unlawful conduct. (Cooley on Torts 2nd, Ed.
p. 581 ; Pollo ck on Torts, 2nd, Ed. p. 452 ; Harvester
Co., v.Meinhardt, 60 Haw. Pr. 168 ; 9 Abb. N. C. 393
People v. Kostka, 4 N. Y. Crim. Rep. 429 ; Rogers v.
Evarts, 17 N. Y. Sup. 264 ; Com. v Hunt supra.; Walker
v. Cronin, 107 Mass. 553 ; State v. Stewart, 59 Vt. 273
Payne v.Railroad Co., 49 Am. R. 666 ; Chambers v.Baldwin
15 S. W. Rep. 57 ; Bouler v. Macauley, 15 S. W. Rep. 60
Toledo A. A. & N. M. Ry. Co., v, Penn. Co., 54 Fed. 730;
Thomas v. Ry. Co., 62 Fed. 803).
Where the losses of the employer are incidental to
the lawful acts of the strikers it is damnum absgue
injuria and the strikers are not answerable. When,
however, the strike is in the nature of a boycott and
designed primarily to injure the employer or third
parties, then the strikers are answerable in damages.
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.A boycott being a conspiracy designed to injure another
in his trade or business, and being as such unlawful, a
civil action will lie against the boycotters for any
damages resulting therefpvm. (Old Dominion S. S. Co.,
V. McKenna 30 Fed. 48 ; Moores & Co. v. Bricklayers' Union,
23 Weekly L. Bul. 48 ; People v. Wilzig, 4 N. Y. Crim.
Rep. 403 ; Thomas v. Railway Co., 62 Fed. 803 ; Toledo
A. A. & N. M. Ry. Co., v. Penn. Co., 54 Fed. 730).
In qity : Of late years equity has been much
appealed to for the remedy of injunction against strikes
and boycotts. The injunction has been granted where-
ever the strikes were being conducted unlawfully and the
injuries resulting therefrom were continuous, and such
as could not be compensated in a civil action for
damages.
Writs of injunction were refused to the petitioners
in Harvester Co., v. Meinhardt . and ogers v.
Evarts supraon the ground that no intimidation or vio-
lence accompanied the strikes to render them unlawful.
Injunctions were granted restraining boycotts in Brace
Bros.,v Evans; Casey v Cincinnati Typographical Union;
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and Moore v Bricklarers' Union ; reviewed above.
In United States v. orkingtnens' Amalgamated AssoGia-
tion it was held that an injunction would lie against
the strikers who by violence and intimidation were
forcing a discontinuance. of business, including the
transportation of goods from state to state.
In the United States v.Debs supra., an injunction
was granted against the Pulman strikers enjoining the
officers and members of the American Railway Union and
all other persons from interfering with the carriage of
the mails or obstructing and restraining interstate
commerce. This action of the Circuit Court was ap-
proved by the United States Supreme Court in the case
of In re Debs suipa.
In Toledo,A. A.& N. WeRya Co.,_v.,Penn, Co.,,et
al. (54 Fed. 746), in Circuit Court for N.D. of Ohio,
March 29, 1893., it is decided that where a labor or-
ganization has declared a boycott againtt a railroad,
and connecting roads are therefore refusing or seem about
to refuse, to afford equal facilities to the boycotted
road, in violation of section 3, of the interstate com-
merce act, they may be compelled to do so by mandatory
injunction, since the case is urgent, the rights of the
108
parties free from reasonable doubt, and the duty sought
to be enforced is imposed by law. Such mandatory in-
junction is binding on all the officers and employes of
the respondent railroad, having proper notice thereof,
whether they be made parties or not. And an engineer,
who, while still remaining in the Employ of the respon-
dent company, refuses to attach to his train a car of the
respondent company as commanded by the injunction, is
guilty of comtempt of court, and punis'hable accordingly.
In this same case, (54 Fed., 730,
the court held that a combination to induce
and procure the officers of a coimion carrier corporation,
subject to the interstate commerce act, and its locomo-
tive engineers, to refuse to receive, handle and haul
interstate freight from another like common carrier in
order to injure the latter is a conpiracy to commit a
misdemeanor under the interstate commerce act, and crim-
inal. Here the court granted a preliminary injunction
against Mr. Arthur, Chief of the Brotherhood of Locomo-
tive Engineers, to re st rain him from giving any order
or signal for carrying out the unlawvful objects of the
conspiracy, and held that the court may issue a manda-
tory injunction compel li~g him to rescind such unlaw ful
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order already issued, especially where the necessary
effect of the order or signal is to induce flagrant
violations of an injunction previously issued by the
coutt.
A Court of Equity will enjoin any attempt of
strikers to interfere with the management of a road in
control of a receiver acting under order of the court,
and will. punish as contempt any such interferancp,
(Thomas v. Railway Co., supra. ; Toledo A. A. & N. M.
R_ . Co., v. Penn., Co., supra ; Union Trust Co., v.
Atchison T. & S. F. Ry. Co. 64 Fed. 724).
The equitable remedy of injunction received an
extreme application in the case of Farmer'sLoan and
Fruit Co., v. Northern Pacific Railway Co., ( 60 Fed.
803). Here the United States Circuit Court sus-
tained an injunction restraining the employes of a re-
ceiver operating a railroad, under order of the court,
from going out on a proposed strike against a propose.
reduction of wages. It was also held that the court
may grant an injunction against the executive heads of
the various labor organizations of railroad eniployes
rest raining them from ordering a strike of the snployes
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of. a receiver. The court justified the injunctions on
the alleged grounds that the proposed strike was de-
signed to cripple and embarrass the operation of the
road by the officer of the court, and that strikes were
always accompanied by disorder and violence and were
necessarily unlawful.
The extreme use of the injunction in this case
has no precedent. It has received much adverse crit-
icism by the legal profession ; and it remains yet to
be seen whether other courts will follow this decision,
and carry the propositions here laid down to their
logical conclusions. The decision is a bold one, ana
presses hard upon the boundary line which separates the
powers of the courts fran the cherished rights and lib-
erties of individuals.
Section 2. Penal Remedies.
Whenever the conspiracy of the strikers or boycott-
ers is declared criminal by the common law, or by state
or by United States statutes, or wherever threats, in-
timidation, force or violence have been re sorted to to
further the purposes of the conspiracy, the conspirators
are all punishable by indictment, and by fine or impris-
onnrnt. (See all the cases reviewed above.)
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When strikers disregard and disobey an injunction
of the court restraining their conduct, or when they in-
terfere unlawfully with the operation of a road by a re-
ceiver acting under order of the court, they are pun-
ishable for contempt. (Toledo A. A. & N. M. Ry.
Co. v. Penn. Co., supra" Thomas v. Ry. Co. supra;
U. S. v. Debs, §upra ; Union Trust Co. v. Atchison T. &
S. F. Ry. Co. supra ; Farmer's Loan & Trust Co. v.
N. Pac. Ry. Co. supra.)
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CONCLUSIONS.
As a result of this examination of the leading
American cases, involving strikesA we conclude that in
America the workingman, of whatever rank, has complete
liberty in the disposition of his labor. All state
statutes and courts recognize the rights of the laborer
to work for whom, and for what wages, he pleases, or to
refuse to work, as he pleases. Workmen may form associa-
tions for all benefibent and lawful purposes. They may
lawfully meet together to consult for the promotion of
their own interests. They may enter into agreements and
combinations for the advancement or preservation of their
wages, or for the reduction of the hours of labor, or for
altering by peaceable and lawful means any of the con-
ditions of their employment. They may enforce upon the
members of the association by fine or expulsion any of the
lawful rules adopted by the society, and to which the
member has given a voluntary assent.
If not boun by contract, they may agree together
and quit work in a body when they please, without incur-
ring either civil or criminal liability, if their purpose
in quitting is to promote their own legitimate interests,
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as the reduction of hours or the advancement of wages.
It is otherwise, however, if the purpose of the combina-
tion and quitting is to violate a contract, or a statute,
to force employers to discharge other workmen or to break
their mutual contracts with third parties.
The laws both state and federal condemn all conspir-
acies intended primarily to boycott or injure third pars-
ties. They condemn the use of intimidation by these con-
spiracies for any purpose.
Having the right to combine for the promotion of
their interests, or to quit their employment, they have a
right to use all peaceable arguments and persuasion to
induce others to join their society, or to quit their
employment, or to refrain from entering the employment
which the strikers have abandoned. They may pay the
expenses or losses of other workmen as an inducement to
them to leave their employment and join the strike. All
this they may lawfully do, as Judge Barrett says :
"Persuasion, argument, entreaty are legitimate methods.
But all attempts of combinations of workingmen to
compel the employer to alter the conduct of his trade or
business or to dictate the number or character of his
employes ; to compel him to discharge some men or to
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to employ others ; or to compel any workman outside the
combination to leave his employment, or to prevent his
working for whom or for what wages he pleases, or
otherwise interfering with him in the enjoyment of his
personal liberty, if these ends are sought to be accom-
plished by threats, coercion, intimidation or violence,
are illegal, and the combination is a criminal conspiracy.
Such combinations are wrongful as interferences- with
personal liberty anddas restraints of trade and commerce.
A combination of workingmen which has for its pur-
pose or for its necessary result to interfere with the
carriage of the mail or to control or restrain interstate
commerce, is held by the United States Courts to be a
criminal conspiracy. And any attempt by workingmen to
interfere, by the use of intimidation or force, with the
operation of a railroad by a receiver under orders of a
federal court, is helfi to be a contempt of court.
The intimidation here condemned by the courts need
not consist of actual threats or violence but may arise
from an attitude of menace, which has the effect of
either physical or moral coercion. No boycott, free
fran such intimidation has come before the courts, but
the decisions in New Yort and some other states intimate
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that a boycott for a lawful purpose, and not accompanied
by such intimidation would not be unlawful.
An action will lie against the members of the con-
spiracy for all damages resulting directly fran an un-
lawful strike or boycott. If the conspiracy is criminal,
either in its purpose or its means of enforcernent, its
members are punishable by indictment. Courts of equity
will use all their power to restrain unlawful strikes
and boycotts by injunction. They will punish as con-
tdmpt any wilful disobedience of their orders.

